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INTRODUCTION
The divergence in wealth distribution is occurring on a national and
global scale. There is growing inequality in the world and, particularly in
the United States, there is a resentment about the concentration of income
and economic power in the hands of the one-percent.1 President Obama
has made reducing wealth inequality the signature issue of his second
term2 and the topic is shaping up as a potentially defining focal point for
the 2016 Presidential election.3
The U.S. economy has begun to recover from the Great Recession
since mid-2009, but the rising tide has not lifted all boats. To the contrary,
median income and wealth both declined in real terms between 2010 and
2013.4 Over essentially the same period, the real income of the top one
percent grew by 31.4 percent.5 Yet, there has been political malaise about
antitrust enforcement in the United States,6 the purpose of which is also to
counter the concentration of power and wealth in society.7
Several authors have called on antitrust policy to play its role in the
combat of inequality in the world. Joseph Stiglitz has called for “stronger
and more effectively enforced competition laws” to help address inequal-
ity.8 Luigi Zingales has argued that “the most powerful argument for anti-
April 13, 2012. It also reflects the author’s unpublished manuscript on hold with Duncan
Kennedy, David Kennedy, Gra´inne de Bu´rca, and Daniela Caruso, (December 26, 2012) and
his doctoral dissertation “Hierarchies as Law” (Harvard Law School, Winter 2014/2015).
Several versions of this work were presented at conferences and workshops at Vienna Law
School in May 2011, at Harvard Law School in April 2010, in June 2013 in December 2014
and March 2015, at Yale Law School in December 2012, at Oxford University in May 2013,
and at London School of Economics in June 2015. The author would like to thank the
participants of these conferences and workshops for their critiques, comments, and advice.
1. See J.M.F. & A.C.M., The Purse of The One Percent, ECONOMIST: DAILY CHART
(Oct. 14, 2014 3:55 PM), http://www.economist.com/blogs/graphicdetail/2014/10/daily-chart-8.
2. See, e.g., WHITE HOUSE OFFICE OF THE PRESS SEC’Y, REMARKS BY THE PRESI-
DENT IN STATE OF THE UNION ADDRESS (Jan. 25, 2015), https://www.whitehouse.gov/the-
press-office/2015/01/20/remarks-president-state-union-address-january-20-2015; WHITE
HOUSE OFFICE OF THE PRESS SEC’Y, REMARKS BY THE PRESIDENT ON ECONOMIC MOBILITY,
(Dec. 4, 2013), http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/2013/12/04/remarks-presidenteco-
nomic-mobility.
3. See, e.g., David Lauter, Income Inequality Emerges as Key Issue in 2016 Presiden-
tial Campaign, L.A. TIMES (Feb. 5, 2015), http://www.latimes.com/nation/la-na-campaign-in-
come-20150205story.html#page=1; Stiglitz: Inequality a “Key Issue” for US Election 2016,
BBC (Apr. 25, 2015), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-32459519.
4. Jonathan B. Baker & Steven C. Salop, Antitrust, Competition Policy, and Inequal-
ity, 104 GEO. L.J. 1, 1 (2015).
5. Id.
6. See id. at 1-28; see also Jonathan B. Baker, Economics and Politics: Perspectives on
the Goals and Future of Antitrust, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 2175, 2178 (2013).
7. See RICHARD WHISH & DAVID BAILEY, COMPETITION LAW 21 (2008).
8. JOSEPH E. STIGLITZ, THE PRICE OF INEQUALITY: HOW TODAY’S DIVIDED SOCIETY
ENDANGERS OUR FUTURE 338 (2012).
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trust law” is that “it reduces the political power of firms.”9 Paul
Krugman10 and Anthony Atkinson11 have also claimed that monopoly
and anticompetitive market conditions are among the root causes of
wealth inequality. Sandeep Vanessan has argued that consumer-oriented
antitrust enforcement can promote more progressive wealth distribution12
and that the lack of competition in many sectors of the U.S. economy is a
powerful driver of economic disparity.13
Today’s antitrust law is global antitrust law. While there are important
differences between models of antitrust in various jurisdictions, these dif-
ferences no longer have as much to do with different values as with differ-
ent presumptions about how to resolve theoretical or empirical
ambiguities raised by a common framework of antitrust economics.14
Modern antitrust analysis reflects the dominance of the economic model
of analyzing antitrust policy. Both in the United States and in the Euro-
pean Union, legal models have embraced an economic methodology based
on maximizing consumer or total welfare15 and have done so in a way that
is common to the diverging political viewpoints in several jurisdictions.16
Trade law analysis is likewise based on the interplay of maximization of
welfare and fairness or justice considerations.17
I will argue that the tools of global antitrust and international trade
law can play a role in social transformation and can be systematically used
for particular purposes of social transformation, but based on three pro-
positions. First, the complex hierarchical structure of production of goods,
services, knowledge, authority, and prestige in global society that gives an-
alytic clarity about its construction18 should be the starting point of legal
and economic analysis. Second, lawyers should articulate targeted resis-
tance to particular hierarchical structures rather than pursue abstract goals
9. LUIGI ZINGALES, A CAPITALISM FOR THE PEOPLE: RECAPTURING THE LOST GE-
NIUS OF AMERICAN PROSPERITY 38 (2012).
10. See Paul Krugman, Robber Baron Recessions, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 18, 2016), http://
www.nytimes.com/2016/04/18/opinion/robber-baron-recessions.html.
11. ANTHONY B. ATKINSON, INEQUALITY: WHAT CAN BE DONE? 126-27 (2015).
12. Sandeep Vanesaan, The Evolving Populisms of Antitrust, 93 NEB. L. REV. 370, 413
(2014).
13. Lina Khan & Sandeep Vaheesan, How America Became Uncompetitive and Une-
qual, WASH. POST (June 13, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/how-america-
became-uncompetitive-and-unequal/2014/06/13/a690ad94-ec00-11e3-b98c-72cef4a00499
_story.html?utm_term=.05359a47eb46.
14. See EINER ELHAUGE & DAMIEN GERADIN, GLOBAL COMPETITION LAW AND ECO-
NOMICS, at V (2d ed. 2011). See generally Lawrence Sullivan & Wolfgang Fikentscher, On the
Growth of the Antitrust Idea, 17 BERKELEY J. INT’L L. 197, 198 (1998).
15. See Baker, supra note 6, at 2178.
16. See ELHAUGE & GERADIN, supra note 14, at v.
17. See generally Joel Trachtman, International Linkage: Transcending “Trade
and . . .”—an Institutional Perspective, 96 AM. J. INT’L. L. 77 (2002).
18. See Damjan Kukovec, Hierarchies as Law, 21.1 COLUM. J. EUR. L. 131, 192 (2014)
[hereinafter Hierarchies as Law]; Damjan Kukovec, Hierarchies as Law (Winter 2014/2015)
(unpublished SJD dissertation) (on file with the Harvard Law School library).
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of equality or competition. Third, in order to articulate new tools for ad-
dressing the reproduction of wealth and power in society, some of the as-
sumptions of global antitrust and trade law need rethinking and amending.
To support these three propositions, this Article addresses and chal-
lenges some of the assumptions of the common framework of antitrust and
trade law analysis.19  There is an ongoing debate in the antitrust literature
on the proper goal of antitrust analysis. Some argue that consumer welfare
should guide antitrust decision-making, while others favor the total wel-
fare standard.20 However, analysis based on the relationship between ab-
stract consumers and abstract producers (the consumer and total welfare
standards) fails to account for the fact that consumers and producers find
themselves in diverse situations in the global production of goods, services,
knowledge, and prestige, that they are positioned differently in the global
value chains21 and that both the consumer and total welfare standards mis-
takenly assume the universal benefit of low prices.
Furthermore, today’s economic methodology of global antitrust is met
with arguments of equity or fairness. This interplay of fairness and welfare
also structures the debate in international economic law, as reflected in a
plethora of “Trade and __” analyses.22 The interplay of abstract efficiency
and fairness considerations, however, can restrict opportunities of restruc-
turing antitrust policy and resistance to the reproduction of the concentra-
tion of power in global society. There are several ways of structuring
competition on the merits and the existing legal structure reflects a partic-
ular understanding of social cost rather than any essential maximization of
welfare.23 Similarly, there are several ways of structuring equity or justice
and there is no guarantee that existing perceptions of justice would not
contribute to the reproduction of existing hierarchies.24 A preference for
either free competition or for justice does not, in itself, explain how the
19. The term antitrust will be used broadly throughout the article. Sullivan & Fikent-
scher, supra note 14, at 197 (“Antitrust is an ambiguous term, especially in an international
setting. It refers to a competition policy dealing with business structure and conduct and,
more broadly, with the appropriate role of business in modern life.”).
20. See generally Alan J. Meese, Reframing the (false?) Choice Between Purchaser
Welfare and Total Welfare, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 2197 (2013); John B. Kirkwood, The Es-
sence Of Antitrust: Protecting Consumers and Small Suppliers from Anticompetitive Conduct,
81 FORDHAM L. REV. 2425 (2013); Maurice E. Stucke, Reconsidering Antitrust’s Goals, 53
B.C. L. REV. 551 (2012); John B. Kirkwood & Robert H. Lande, The Fundamental Goal of
Antitrust: Protecting Consumers, Not Increasing Efficiency, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 191
(2008); Russell Pittman, Consumer Surplus as the Appropriate Standard for Antitrust En-
forcement, 3 COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L 205 (2007); Dennis W. Carlton, Does Antitrust Need
to be Modernized?, 21 J. ECON. PERSP. 155 (2007).
21. See generally Gary Gereffi, John Humphrey & Timothy Sturgeon, The Governance
of Global Value Chains, 1.12 R. INT’L. POL. ECON. 78 (2005).
22. See generally Trachtman, supra note 17.
23. See generally Duncan Kennedy, Cost-Benefit Analysis of Entitlement Problems: A
Critique, 33 STAN. L. REV. 387 (1981).
24. Damjan Kukovec, Taking Change Seriously: The Rhetoric of Justice and the Repro-
duction of the Status Quo, in EUROPE’S JUSTICE DEFICIT? 324 (Dimitry Kochenov, Graine de
Burca & Andrew Williams eds., 2015) [hereinafter Taking Change Seriously].
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existing hierarchical structure of society and the concentration of wealth,
power, authority, and prestige will be affected. Unjust reality can be con-
structed by economic theories and claims as well as by theories and claims
of justice. Rather than interplay of economic and equitable considerations,
the starting point of legal and economic analysis should be the hierarchical
structure of society. An analytical approach that challenges the existing
concentration of wealth in the world must address the privileges to harm
that are allocated differently to different people in the global hierarchical
structure. This disparity of the global allocation of privileges to harm may
pose a more important barrier to trade for those in hierarchically un-
privileged situations than national borders and the related obstacles to
trade that fundamentally inform the international economic and legal
analysis. From this, I will argue that the assumption of legal and economic
theory that non-predatory dumping is not possible on the internal market
is incorrect. It will also be argued that pricing equalization does not occur
due to free market forces unleashed by the end of border controls and of
related measures nor due to the prohibition of exclusive vertical agree-
ments. The main context of my inquiry will be the European Union inter-
nal market, although the implications are worldwide.
This Article has several aims. First, the aim is to show the continuing
importance and relevance of antitrust and international trade lawyers in
countering the concentration of power in the hands of the few or in some
geographic areas of the world, if some of the assumptions of antitrust and
trade are adjusted. Second, the goal is to articulate a particular analysis
from the perspective of the (European) periphery. As the recent Euro cri-
ses and the near exit of Greece from the Union show, the European pros-
pect of development for all has not arrived. This Article will articulate the
privilege of the corporations in a structurally privileged position of the
European center to harm the industry of the periphery and offer one anal-
ysis and explanation for the reproduction of hierarchies and concentration
of wealth in the center of the European Union. The doctrine developed on
this basis is called “dumping practices of the center.” Third, the aim is to
challenge the sensibility that economic thinking is the main culprit in the
concentration of power and economic impoverishment of some parts or
sections of the world. Rather, what needs to be challenged is the existing
social understanding of injury, in economic thinking just as much as in
thinking about equity or fairness. In arguing for a reversal of social under-
standing of harm, economic analysis can be used as an important tool for
social transformation.
Section I addresses the current debate on combating inequality
through antitrust law. The assumptions of the discussion do not serve
transformative possibilities and I advocate for a targeted resistance to the
existing hierarchical structure of society with adjusted tools of antitrust
and trade law. Section II sets out a specific macro hierarchical struc-
ture–the center-periphery relationship in the European Union. Price dif-
ferences form a basis for dumping practices on the EU internal market
that contribute to the concentration of power, wealth, authority, and pres-
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tige in the center of the European Union. Section III sets out the rationale
for dumping in international trade. Section IV further explains the doc-
trine “dumping practices of the European center” and challenges some
assumptions of antitrust and trade law. Section V explores the general ar-
guments against the doctrine of dumping and further challenges the idea
of the benefit of low prices. Section VI questions the idea of “competition
on the merits” in the EU internal market.
I. ANTITRUST AS A TOOL FOR COMBATING INEQUALITY
A. Resisting Market Power
In his recent book Inequality: What Can Be Done?, British economist
Anthony Atkinson argues that the United States has erred in shifting away
from the Sherman Act’s original focus on wealth inequality towards a pure
consumer welfare orientation for antitrust law.25 Paul Krugman argues
that “increasing business concentration could be an important factor in
stagnating demand for labor, as corporations use their growing monopoly
power to raise prices without passing the gains on to their employees.”26
Jonathan Baker and Steven Salop argue that while it is not possible to
identify with precision the relative magnitudes of various factors contrib-
uting to growing inequality, market power likely has an effect. Relying on
Thomas Piketty’s analysis, they argue that because the exercise of market
power tends to raise the return to capital, it can contribute to the develop-
ment and perpetuation of inequality. As market power grows more com-
mon and visible, argue Baker and Salop, an increasing public concern with
inequality might be expected to call for a competition policy response.27
Baker and Salop set forth a range of possible antitrust policy adjust-
ments that might be considered in response to market power, or inequality
more generally.28 According to them, concerns with inequality can impli-
cate antitrust and competition policy in two general ways. First, a more
forceful approach to antitrust implementation may perform a corrective
function, assuming market power affects inequality. Second, antitrust reg-
ulatory agencies may prioritize lowering the consequences of inequality
when advancing their programs.29
Baker and Salop argue that greater antitrust enforcement would gen-
erally advance the dispersal of income and wealth by decreasing the im-
pact of market power. This would happen especially if the agencies fully
embrace the consumer welfare standard.30 They argue that this is because
this standard prohibits conduct that works to the detriment of consumers
and to the benefit of shareholders. In contrast, they argue, the aggregate
25. ATKINSON, supra note 11, at 126-27.
26. Paul Krugman, Robots and Robber Barons, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 9, 2012), http://
www.nytimes.com/2012/12/10/opinion/krugman-robots-and-robber-barons.html?_r=0.
27. Baker & Salop, supra note 4, at 13.
28. Id. at 14-28.
29. Id. at 14.
30. Id. at 18.
Fall 2016] Economic Law, Inequality, and Hidden Hierarchies 7
welfare standard, which takes into account the benefits to producers, can
contribute to inequality. This standard can permit market behavior that
leads to the creation and exercise of market power. When cost savings or
other efficiencies associated with the conduct are not shared with consum-
ers, market power increases producer surplus. The benefits accrue
predominantly to shareholders and top executives, who usually are wealth-
ier than the consumers of the products.31
Growing concern about inequality, according to Baker and Salop, that
leads to the recognition of additional harms from market power, in turn
would justify reconsideration of that direction in favor of adopting more
interventionist antitrust rules that would recognize greater harm from
market power than had previously been identified.32
In this analysis, resistance to inequality translates into almost indis-
criminate resistance to “market power,” without an account as to how and
why precisely accumulation of capital, wealth, and power occurs and who
gains from it. Furthermore, reliance on protectionist considerations and
equality in general does not assure change for the benefit of those who
find themselves in structurally unprivileged positions in society.33 Finding
a systemic legal regime that will favor the weaker party, such as the class
of consumers, is fraught with analytical difficulties. Postulating an abstrac-
tion of a “weaker party” as the underlying reality of the world and aiming
to help this presumably preexisting category can lead to reproduction of
several hierarchical structures.34 The danger of challenging market power
in the abstract, as in Baker and Salop’s proposal, without adequately ad-
dressing the complexity of the hierarchical structure of society and without
developing a clearer analytical picture of concentration and reproduction
of power in society leads to a discussion at a purely conceptual level with-
out ever raising the necessary appreciation of the economic, social, and
ethical issues, which the work of lawyers should engage in the pursuit of
advocacy for the most vulnerable. Consequently, such reasoning may well
contribute to the reproduction of the existing distribution of material and
spiritual values in the world.35
The analytical weakness of Baker and Salop’s proposal is confirmed
by Daniel Crane’s distributional analysis. He argues that it is far from cer-
tain that antitrust violations (including cartels, anticompetitive mergers,
and abuses of dominance) systematically redirect wealth from the poor to
31. Id. at 16. They do argue that application of a consumer welfare standard in princi-
ple could increase inequality in matters where consumers tend to be wealthy and the sellers
are small firms owned by middle class entrepreneurs, such as hypothetical cartels among
worker-owned manufacturers of luxury goods, such as fine crystal products or yachts. How-
ever, they expect those situations are rare. Id. at 17.
32. Id. at 21.
33. See Kukovec, Taking Change Seriously, supra note 24, at 324-30.
34. Id. at 329-30.
35. Id. Justice is often understood within a particular framework of interpretation,
which contributes to reaffirmation of existing perceptions of social injury rather than chal-
lenging them.
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the rich.36 In order to sustain a showing that they do, one would have to
have information about a large number of factors, including the relative
wealth of producers and consumers, overcharge pass-on rates, the effects
of market power on employees of the firm, the distribution of rents as
between managers and shareholders, and the distribution of rents among
classes of managers.
The assumption underlying the progressive claim of antitrust enforce-
ment is that senior managers and wealthy shareholders of large companies
capture the majority of the rents attributable to anticompetitive conduct,
and hence outpacing the typical consumer in the accumulation of wealth.
In this picture, relatively poorer consumers bear the brunt of monopoly
overcharges.37 But it is far from certain that CEOs and rich shareholders
are “in fact capturing the lions’ share of monopoly profits.”38 Monopoly
rents are not captured uniformly by the owners of capital (i.e. sharehold-
ers), but are distributed in various complex ways throughout the firm, in-
cluding its workers.39 The monopoly labor wage premium has been
observed across a variety of industries.40 Blue-collar workers may be able
to extract significant monopoly rents from their employers, thus counter-
balancing any regressive effects caused by shareholder or senior manage-
ment rent extraction.
The idea that monopoly rents end up solely in the hands of the
wealthy executives resonates with the widely-held assumption in the Euro-
pean legal discourse that the award of a government procurement contract
to a peripheral company offering the lowest price, also due to cheaper
labor in the European periphery, benefits only the capitalist class of the
periphery, but not workers or other interests beyond the boundaries of the
36. Daniel A. Crane, Antitrust and Wealth Inequality, 101 CORNELL L. REV. 1171, 1174
(2016). Despite some the merits of Crane’s distributional analysis, it should not be accepted
at face value. For example, Crane’s analysis and conclusion as to the progressive effects of
monopoly overcharges in government procurement contracts regime is inaccurate. He as-
sumes that wealthier consumers pay more for monopoly overcharges because they pay higher
taxes due to progressive taxation. Thus, he concludes, anticompetitive behavior has progres-
sive effects. He does not, however, take into consideration the fact that poorer consumers
and citizens may often be the larger recipients of budget transfers and thus carry the cost of
monopoly overcharges by the fact that less services, goods, or funds are available to them due
to the higher prices of goods and services paid by public authorities because of monopoly
overcharges.
37. Id. at 1184.
38. Id. at 1187.
39. Id. at 1192 (citing Mark J. Roe, The Shareholder Wealth Maximization Norm and
Industrial Organization, 149 U. PA L. REV. 2063, 2068 (2001)).
40. See Maria Guadalupe, Product Market Competition, Returns to Skill, and Wage
Inequality, 25 J. LABOR ECON. 439 (2007) (surveying literature); David Card, The Impact of
Deregulation on the Employment and Wages of Airline Mechanics, 39 INDUS. & LABOR REL.
REV. 527 (1986); Ana L. Revenga, Exporting Jobs? The Impact of Import Competition on
Employment and Wages in U.S. Manufacturing, 107 Q. J. ECON. 255 (1992); George J. Borjas
& Valerie A. Ramey, Foreign Competition, Market Power, and Wage Inequality, 110 Q. J.
ECON. 1075 (1995).
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firm.41 A conclusion that an increase in market power of a particular com-
pany, either by monopolization or an award of a procurement contract
based on low price, does not have positive consequences beyond manage-
ment and shareholders cannot simply be drawn. Nor can a simple conclu-
sion be drawn that combating abstract market power with existing tools of
antitrust law will lead to reductions of inequality. A broad challenge to
“market power” assumes an inaccurate picture of concentration of wealth
and power in society and thus gives insufficient guidance for addressing it.
B. Antitrust as a Field of Competition but not Distribution
Crane argues that there are so many unknowables in antitrust enforce-
ment that antitrust law is not suitable for addressing wealth inequality.42
In order to draw any firm conclusions regarding the net effect on wealth
distribution of market power exercises and antitrust enforcement, one
would need to prove the relative magnitudes of the cross-cutting effects.
That is a task that, Crane claims, to his knowledge, has never been under-
taken and “could not likely be done with anything approaching statistical
rigor.”43
By contrast, Crane claims that the antitrust system is reasonably com-
petent at generating consumer welfare and economic efficiency, at creat-
ing a larger pie.44 He sets out that the Sherman Act rests on the premise
that the unrestrained interaction of competitive forces will yield the best
allocation of economic resources, the lowest prices, the highest quality,
and the greatest material progress, while at the same time providing an
environment conducive to the preservation of democratic political and so-
cial institutions.45
According to Crane, antitrust causes essentially two economic effects.
First, it eliminates deadweight losses that arise from monopoly pricing and
hence grows the social welfare pie; elimination of deadweight loss is as-
serted not to have any direct distributive effects.46 Second, antitrust en-
forcement prevents redistribution of wealth from consumers to
producers.47 Thus, Crane concludes that antitrust law works best as a set
of objective principles regarding “measurable economic effects” in com-
mercial markets.48
It remains unclear, however, what these measurable economic effects
are, especially if the effects of antitrust policy are so difficult to predict, as
41. For a discussion of the European periphery, see Damjan Kukovec, Law and the
Periphery, 21 EUR. L.J. 406 (2014); Alexander Somek, From Workers to Migrants, from Dis-
tributive Justice to Inclusion: Exploring the Changing Social Democratic Imagination, 18 EUR.
L.J. 711, 714-15 (2012).
42. Crane, supra note 36, at 1228.
43. Id. at 1208.
44. Id. at 1177 n.13.
45. N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958).
46. Crane, supra note 36, at 1177.
47. Id.
48. Id. at 1228.
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Crane’s analysis suggests.49 If “the net effect on wealth distribution from
general increases or decreases in overall antitrust enforcement is virtually
impossible to tell,”50 how can a conclusion be drawn that existing antitrust
law based on existing economic assumptions maximizes consumer welfare
and generates a larger pie than its alternative construction?
As Ronald Coase has argued, the goal of legal and economic analysis
should be to choose the solution that yields the least costs.51 However,
Coase claims that cannot be achieved on the basis of theory. Instead, it
“has to come from a detailed investigation of the actual results of handling
the problem in different ways.”52 If the detailed investigation of the actual
results could not likely be done with anything approaching statistical rigor,
then “measurable economic effects,” consumer welfare or total welfare,
are just as uncertain as the distribution of wealth. In other words, calcula-
tion of the sum of individual welfare runs into the same difficulty and un-
certainty as calculation of wealth distribution as Crane portrays.
The effects of antitrust enforcement seem coherent when its goal is
framed in terms of aiming at “competition” or at elimination of the dead-
weight loss. It is assumed that some competitors win on the market by
being the most innovative, the most responsive to consumers’ wishes, and
by producing goods or services in the most efficient way possible. It would
thus be strange, and indeed harmful, if that firm could then be condemned
for being a monopolist.53 However, competition itself, just as the calcula-
tion of individual welfare, can be structured in several different ways.
Louis Kaplow and Steven Shavell argue that “as a practical matter it
will rarely if ever be the case that one of two policies under serious consid-
eration will literally make everyone better off than the other.”54 The out-
come of the standard of consumer or total welfare or consumer welfare
indeed depends on the initial valuations.55 The argument that will win the
claim of maximization of global welfare will be a result of a decision,56 and
cannot be based on an abstract formula of consumer welfare defined as
the excess of social valuation of product over the price actually paid or on
total welfare that combines consumer and producer benefits.57
49. Id.
50. Id. at 1174.
51. Robert H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J. L. & ECON. 1, 18-19 (1960).
52. Id.
53. As the Honorable Learned Hand opined in United States v. Aluminum Co. of
America: “[A] single producer may be the survivor out of a group of active companies,
merely by virtue of his superior skill, foresight and industry . . . .” The successful competitor,
having been urged to compete, must not be turned upon when he wins. 148 F.2d 416, 430 (2d
Cir. 1945).
54. Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Fairness versus Welfare: Notes on the Pareto Prin-
ciple, Preferences, and Distributive Justice, 32 J. LEGAL STUD. 331, 336 (2003).
55. See Kennedy, supra note 23, at 444.
56. Id.
57. See infra Section IV.
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Despite the acknowledgment of various possibilities for welfare max-
imization, scholars often revert to abstract reasoning in terms of max-
imization of production and consumption. For example, as I further
explore in Section V, it is assumed in international trade that, “[p]rovided
that the firm is pricing above its average variable costs, its behavior should
not be considered problematic, and according to economic theory, no rem-
edy is necessary.”58
However, economic thinking should be understood as a tool for social
transformation, not a repository of ready-made solutions that could serve
as normative guides and a substitute for a detailed investigation of the
actual results. One thus cannot conclude, as Crane does, that antitrust is
good at producing competition and consumer welfare, but cannot be used
for distributive purposes. Rather, the conclusion is that both claims that
antitrust law, as currently conceived, produces competition and maximizes
welfare, or that it produces social equality, rest on uncertain and incoher-
ent assumptions.
C. Antitrust as an Inadequate Tool for Addressing Inequality –
Preference for Tax and Transfer
Likewise, we are also unable to follow Crane’s conclusion that as a
matter of comparative institutional advantage, the antitrust system is far
inferior to other branches of law and governmental authority in addressing
wealth equality and that therefore distribution should only be addressed
through tax and transfer.59
Crane’s conclusion is based on the argument that the legal system is
generally inferior to the income tax and transfer system in the redistribu-
tion of wealth.60 According to Kaplow and Shavell, competition law is a
weak mechanism for achieving distributive outcomes since it is poorly
targeted, particularly in comparison to a tax and transfer system. In con-
trast, a tax and transfer system can be designed to both target post-transfer
equality, while being feasible.61
Thinking in terms of taxation and redistribution through the budget,
however, misses, and obscures, questions of both distribution and develop-
ment.62 It misses the essential point of legal analysis. Identification of
structural injury is important even if redistribution through the tax system
is found to be more efficient than the legal system.
As will be argued in Section II, companies of the European center
have a legally sanctioned privilege to harm companies of the periphery.
Companies on the periphery cannot be compensated for this injury
58. Mark Wu, Antidumping in Asia’s Emerging Giants, 53 HARV. INT’L L.J. 101, 111
(2012).
59. Crane, supra note 36, at 1225.
60. Id.
61. Louis Kaplow, On the Choice of Welfare Standards in Competition Law, in HARV.
L. SCH. JOHN M. OLIN CTR. FOR LAW, ECON. & BUS. DISCUSSION PAPER SERIES (Paper 693)
4 (2011).
62. See Kennedy, supra note 23, at 465.
12 Michigan Journal of International Law [Vol. 38:1
through the tax and transfer system because of EU state aid rules, which
prevent any company from receiving government support since that sup-
port provides an advantage over its competitors.63 In other words, if unjust
injury is not articulated and not acknowledged, it cannot be determined
who should be compensated either through the legal system or through tax
and transfer.
In fact, the suggestion for redistribution through the budget is un-
targeted when we do not know who needs compensation. Redistribution
through taxation could fulfill its goals on the presupposition that all the
past and future injuries in a society have already been identified, and that
we thus know how to remedy them through the budget transfer. However,
neither social change through tax and transfer, nor through the legal sys-
tem can be pursued without legal analysis that is not based on imminent
meanings of competition.
Crane’s assumptions about antitrust law’s ability to ensure competi-
tion, but not distribution, which should be left to tax and transfer, bring us
to the same conclusion as Thomas Piketty’s analysis of fighting inequal-
ity—to a conclusion of combating inequality through taxation without an
analysis of how this redistribution should occur.
Social processes, including competition and the process of concentra-
tion of capital and wealth, cannot be adequately depicted or addressed by
economic theories or formulas.64 For example, Piketty’s conclusion that a
rate of return on capital (r) is greater than economic growth (g), (r ? g), is
an ex post facto rationalization of the phenomenon of accumulation of
capital. While the private rate of return on capital can be significantly
higher for long periods of time than the rate of growth of income and
output,65 this finding does not articulate the reasons for this. It does not
articulate the specific injuries that could explain the phenomenon of ac-
cumulation of capital or of the concentration of wealth. It does not give us
an analytical perspective of what accumulation of capital we would want
to resist and what accumulation of capital we would want to honor. It suf-
fers from the same problem of under and overinclusion as Baker and
Salop’s proposal to resist the concentration of “market power.”66 Resis-
tance to “accumulation of capital,” just as resistance to “capitalism,”67 is
thus unable to address structural injury that would allow reversing the re-
petitive structural injuries of the hierarchically privileged and significantly
63. See, e.g., WHISH & BAILEY, supra note 7, at 462.
64. See Kukovec, Hierarchies as Law, supra note 18, at 165.
65. THOMAS PIKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 571 (2014).
66. See generally Baker & Salop, supra note 4.
67. Anti-capitalist rhetoric is frequently used as a rhetorical support for one’s political
preference without analytical added-value. See Damjan Kukovec, A Critique of the Rhetoric
of Common Interest in the EU Legal Discourse, (Apr. 13, 2012) (working paper) http://pa-
pers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2178332. See also Kukovec, Law and the Periph-
ery, supra note 41, at 410; Kukovec, Hierarchies as Law, supra note 18, at 162.
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limits our options for social reimagination.68 This approach calls for in-
creased transfers through taxation without articulating resistance to select
injuries.
To conclude, antitrust and trade legal analysis can serve as a tool of
social transformation and of resistance to concentration of wealth and
power in society. However, neither Crane’s nor Baker and Salop’s analysis
appear to serve transformative possibilities. Lawyers need to address the
existing understanding of social cost and welfare maximization in order to
open up the range of social options.69 Therefore, I will advocate for a
targeted rearticulation of antitrust and trade analysis and propose a new
doctrine in the European Union internal market as an example of such
analysis.
D. Addressing the Hierarchical Structure
Despite an appeal to rethinking the current understanding of social
cost and wealth maximization, a conclusion that economic thinking should
be the main target of resistance to the reproduction of the concentration
of wealth would be mistaken. On the contrary, economic thinking can be
an important element of the challenge to the concentration of power and
wealth.
Today, many ills of society are often ascribed to economic thinking or
neoliberalism.70 For example, the idea that there is a ubiquitous neoliberal
rationality that remakes everything and everyone in the image of homo
oeconomicus and that transposes the constituent elements of democracy
into an economic register.71 However, reality cannot be described solely
by economic theory.
Theories are timeless abstractions, rationalizations that cannot ade-
quately describe reality, but as a partial ex post facto rationalization. Ide-
ology, however, is constantly fluid and changing, reflecting the hierarchies
we collectively find just and unjust. It is the ideology of every moment in
time that defines reality, not a theory.72 Thus, resistance to economic the-
ory or economic thinking as such cannot be understood as a recipe for
challenging the reproduction of power and wealth. Instead, the existing
68. See Kukovec, Law and the Periphery, supra note 41, at 411; Kukovec, Hierarchies
as Law, supra note 18, at 192.
69. See Kukovec, Taking Change Seriously, supra note 24, at 334.
70. See, e.g., Kerry Rittich, The Future of Law and Development: Second Generation
Reforms and the Incorporation of the Social, in THE NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOP-
MENT: A CRITICAL APPRAISAL 203 (David M. Trubek & Alvaro Santos eds. 2006); GALIT A.
SARFATY, VALUES IN TRANSLATION: HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE CULTURE OF THE WORLD
BANK 15 (2012).
71. See generally WENDY BROWN, UNDOING THE DEMOS: NEOLIBERALISM’S STEALTH
REVOLUTION (2015). For a critique, see Kukovec, Hierarchies as Law, supra note 18, at 137;
Kukovec, Law and the Periphery, supra note 41, at 412; Kukovec, Taking Change Seriously,
supra note 24, at 325.
72. For the critique of David Kennedy’s synonym between economics and ideology,
see Kukovec, Hierarchies as Law, supra note 18, at 164-65.
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hierarchical structure of society and ideology and the social understanding
of injury that underpins it need to be challenged.73
The starting point of my analysis is that law and governance should be
understood as a constant hierarchical struggle.74 In this struggle, the hier-
archically privileged repeatedly injure those in a structurally subordinate
position and these harms perpetuate their hierarchical position.75 Hierar-
chies can be managed, reproduced, or reconstructed, but they are ineradi-
cable. People have very different powers to injure others, depending on
where in the global hierarchical structure they find themselves. Some
harms, however, are perceived as normal. Repetition of countless uncon-
tested injuries reproduces the existing hierarchies in society. In order to
combat the existing reproduction of concentration, those injuries and the
hierarchical reality need to be identified and new tools and doctrines re-
sisting them constructed.76
In the construction of the doctrine of “dumping practices of the Euro-
pean center” in the next section, no particular theory of fairness or aiming
at restoring a moral balance in the world is professed. A preference for
equity over welfare or vice versa is not argued. The proposed distribu-
tional analysis is based on individual well-being.77 It is nonetheless based
on the premise that there is no single way to maximize societies’ welfare.
There are, instead, many, depending on the weight attached to the welfare
of a particularly situated individual, each with different distributional
consequences.78
The aim of the analysis is to articulate a particular vision of hierarchi-
cal subordination. The portrayed resistance is not untargeted. Crane cor-
rectly argues that there is extreme complexity in antitrust analysis,79 as
there is complexity in law in general. But harms are not entirely random;
repetitive hierarchical structures can be identified and contested. There
are countless hierarchical structures at play in our societies that contribute
to the reproduction of wealth, power, knowledge, and prestige in the
world. I will address a particular macro-hierarchical structure of society,
the center-periphery relationship in the European Union, in order to por-
tray an example of the type of antitrust and trade analysis that is missed
globally.
73. See id.
74. See id. at 168.
75. See id.
76. See id.
77. Hence no weight should be accorded to independent notions of fairness, other
than many purely distributive notions. See Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Economic Analy-
sis of Law, in HARV. L. SCH. JOHN M. OLIN CTR. FOR LAW, ECON. & BUS. DISCUSSION
PAPER SERIES (Paper 251) 332-35 (1999).
78. See Kennedy, supra note 23, at 389.
79. Crane, supra note 36, at 1224.
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II. THE EUROPEAN UNION INTERNAL MARKET
A. The Center-Periphery Perspective
The common intuition has been that the European Union takes in
poor countries and turns them into high-income countries and that like-
wise, the interests “of the other” are taken into account in EU legal dis-
course, and that all nations are in control of the larger processes of the
Union.
However, my own intuition has been that the interests and concerns of
the new peripheral Member countries were difficult to express in the ex-
isting legal discourse and that this crucially influences their position in the
European Union. The current Euro crisis simply brought to the fore a
larger and hitherto invisible structural problem as to the relationship be-
tween the European Union’s center and its periphery.80
What is the center and what is the periphery of the European Union?
The center countries or regions are those with a much higher gross domes-
tic product (GDP) per capita than the regions of the periphery. They in-
vest more money in research and development and have the best
universities. They have more capital and more ingoing and outgoing for-
eign direct investment (FDI). Their actors, products, and services have
more prestige. Internationally recognized brands come from the center,
which give their owners significant market power. Branded firms enjoy
higher margins and more loyal customers, who will also not switch to an-
other brand despite a price increase.81 The center exports final products
and is the seat of powerful corporations and law firms. Countries of the
center include Germany, France, the Netherlands, Austria, Sweden, Fin-
land, and the United Kingdom.82
The periphery has a much weaker industrial sector and a less efficient
agricultural sector. It has very few brands known beyond its borders. Non-
branded companies typically earn lower margins and are constantly at risk
of being undercut by cheaper rivals.83 Some of the few famous brands of
Eastern Europe have in fact been bought by established companies of the
center.84 Regions of the periphery have a lower GDP per capita, and the
actors, products, and services from the periphery have much less prestige.
80. See Kukovec, Hierarchies as Law, supra note 18, at 134.
81. See Brand New: Emerging-Market Companies Are Trying to Build Global Brands,
ECONOMIST (Aug. 4, 2012), http://www.economist.com/node/21559894 (“[N]on-branded com-
panies typically earn gross margins of 3-8% and are constantly at risk of being undercut by
cheaper rivals. Branded firms enjoy fatter margins (15% or more) and more loyal
customers.”).
82. The United Kingdom will stay in the center of the Union no matter if it exits in the
Union or not. See Kukovec, supra note 18 (unpublished SJD dissertation).
83. See id.
84. For example, the Czech car company Sˆkoda was bought by the Volkswagen group,
which is seen as a success story. See, e.g., IBS Ctr. Mgmt. Research, Volkswagen’s Acquisition
of Skoda Auto: A Central European Success Story (2007), http://www.icmrindia.org/casestud-
ies/catalogue/Business%20Strategy/Volkswagen%20Acquisition%20of%20Skoda%20Auto-
Business%20Strategy%20Case%20Study.htm.
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They often produce semi-final products or final products for a brand of the
center. The wages are lower than in the center, and often (with the excep-
tion of the European south) the life expectancy is lower. Countries of the
periphery include Hungary, Portugal, Greece, Bulgaria, Cyprus, Latvia,
Poland, Slovenia, and Estonia.85
The legal discourse discussion in the European Union, as the legal
discourse globally, is caught up in the universalized debate in terms of
efficiency and equity, in the interplay between individualist and protec-
tionist considerations. But this leaves the hierarchical structure of society
and the privileges of some to harm others untouched.
Once the European legal structure is seen as a plethora of hierarchies
among people with particular freedoms and prohibitions,86 the picture of
the EU’s legal structure appears quite different from the imagination of a
system seeking a just balance between social and free movement consider-
ations.87 In this new picture, the EU center’s views concerning free move-
ment and social considerations are strong, and are conceived of as natural
or less problematic, whereas the periphery’s claims are often perceived as
harmful.88
Social justice is frequently addressed from the perspective of the Eu-
ropean center.89 The discussion ensuing from the Laval90 and Viking91
85. For a more detailed center-periphery analysis see generally Kukovec, Law and the
Periphery, supra note 41.
86. Instead, the legal system could be understood as an interplay of injuries and
recognitions. See Kukovec, Hierarchies as Law, supra note 18, at 181.
87. For the idea of the balance of autonomy and protectionist considerations in EU
law, see, e.g., Miguel Poiares Maduro, Striking the Elusive Balance Between Economic Free-
dom and Social Rights in the EU, in THE EU AND HUMAN RIGHTS 450-72 (Philip Alston ed.,
1999).
88. See Kukovec, Law and the Periphery, supra note 41, at 413.
89. For a more in-depth discussion of the justice within a particular framework of in-
terpretation, see Kukovec, Taking Change Seriously, supra note 24, at 9.
90. Case C-341/05, Laval un Partneri Ltd v. Svenska Byggnadsarbetarefo¨rbudet, 2007
E.C.R. I-11845. For a very similar factual situation, see also Case C-346/06, Dirk Ru¨ffert v.
Land Niedersachsen, 2008 E.C.R. I-1989.
91. Case C-438/05, International Transport Workers Federation, Finnish Seaman’s
Union v. Viking Line, 2007 E.C.R. I-1081-15. The plaintiff Viking, a Finnish shipping com-
pany with an Estonian subsidiary, was involved in a legal action against union activities. Vi-
king is a ferry operator, operating a ferry between Helsinki, Finland and Tallinn, Estonia.
The ferry was registered in Finland with a predominantly Finnish crew working
under Finnish labor standards. The ferry was not making sufficient profit, so Vi-
king decided to reflag the ferry in Estonia and replace the Finnish crew with an
Estonian crew working under Estonian labor law, which would be far less expen-
sive. Both the Finnish and Estonian seafarers’ unions were members of the inter-
national union, which fought against the “flag of convenience” policy and
attempted to defend seafarers against low wage strategies. The international union
advised its members not to enter into collective negotiations with Viking and the
Estonian union complied, which effectively prevented Viking from reflagging its
ship in Estonia.
Kukovec, Hierarchies as Law, supra note 18, at 150.
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judgments of the European Court of Justice (ECJ) highlighted the prob-
lem of “social dumping” in the European Union. Social dumping is usually
understood as usage of cheaper labor in cross-border activity and it was
generally prohibited by ECJ in the Laval case.92 The facts and impact of
the Laval case are described below:
Laval, a Latvian construction company, was hired through govern-
ment procurement on a public works contract in Sweden. [Note
that Sweden is a country of the center and Latvia a country of the
periphery.] Laval paid its Latvian workers significantly less than
Swedish workers typically would receive for similar construction
jobs, making the Latvian company more competitive in this re-
spect. A Swedish trade union took industrial action against the
Latvian company because the latter refused to negotiate over
wages for its Latvian workers. The Swedish union’s blockade ef-
fectively forced Laval out of this business. Laval sued the Swedish
union in a Swedish court, which asked the ECJ for an interpreta-
tion of EU law on the subject of the case.
The ECJ concluded that under the facts before it, the Swedish
trade union had violated Laval’s free provision of services. Cru-
cially, however, the ECJ also strongly condemned “social dump-
ing”—the use of lower labor standards to undercut competition.
[Social dumping, from which the European periphery could gen-
erally benefit, is thus prohibited in the European Union.]
The ECJ’s holding depended on the fact that Sweden had not
set a minimum wage by law or by some generally applicable col-
lective agreement. This effectively narrowed the scope of periph-
eral workers’ freedom of movement to a set of specific and
exceptional circumstances, which a state like Sweden could
change relatively easily[.]
The [Laval] judgment represented just a small win for the pe-
riphery, but it caused an unprecedented uproar in legal academia,
the media, social science, and the general public.93
The legal profession reacted fiercely to the judgment and rejected “ec-
onomic” arguments of the periphery, such as the argument of comparative
advantage of cheaper labor.94 The legal profession particularly rejected
social dumping, and the practice was also condemned by the European
Court of Justice.
It will be argued, however, that goods and services dumping by the
European center, on the other hand, is a widespread, EU-law-sanctioned
92. Case C-341/05, Laval un Partneri Ltd. v. Svenska Byggnadsarbetarefo¨rbudet 2007
E.C.R. I-11891-92. For a very similar factual situation, see also Case C-346/06, Dirk Ru¨ffert v.
Land Niedersachsen, 2008 E.C.R. I-1989.
93. Kukovec, Hierarchies at Law, supra note 18, at 142.
94. See, e.g., Somek, supra note 41, at 714-15. For a detailed discussion of how the
theory of comparative advantage can be used to the benefit of the European periphery, see
Kukovec, supra note 18 (unpublished SJD dissertation).
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business strategy that can be used by center businesses that go unchal-
lenged by EU competition rules.
B. Price Difference as a Basis for Dumping Practices of
The European Center
There is no condemnation of internal dumping practices in European
Union law, despite the fact these practices have had a significant potential
to harm peripheral industry; however, producers in the periphery have
complained about the extremely low pricing practices by companies of the
center. For example, Slovenian producers have complained about the ab-
normally low prices of pork meat by Austrian producers, which signifi-
cantly damage the Slovenian pork industry.95 Likewise, Slovenian
companies have complained about the very low prices that Austrian con-
struction companies are able to offer on Slovenian markets to compete for
work contracts in government procurement procedures.96
These concerns will now be addressed. Companies of the center today,
on the internal market, have a particular, select, legally-sanctioned privi-
lege to harm companies of the periphery that is allowed under the current
interpretation of the free movement of goods and services and antitrust
laws. The European Union vigorously fights goods dumping from outside
of the Union.97 Yet, EU legal rhetoric provides no vocabulary to articulate
the problem of goods dumping, either below or above cost, on the internal
market.
Companies go to considerable efforts to maintain or gain their market
share and use several strategies for expansion. Selling goods at different
prices in different market segments is one of the most common such strat-
egies. Market segmentation involves dividing a broad target market into
subsets of consumers who have common needs and applications for the
relevant goods and services.98 Depending on the specific characteristics of
the product, these subsets may be divided by criteria such as age and gen-
der, or other distinctions, like location or income. Marketing campaigns
can then be designed and implemented to target these specific customer
segments. This marketing strategy involves dividing a broad target market
into subsets of consumers who have common needs and applications for
the relevant goods and services.99
95. See Tatjana Pihlar, Kmetje: Klavnice se branijo nas˘ih pras˘ie`ev, DNEVNIK (May 7,
2012), http://www.dnevnik.si/slovenija/v-ospredju/1042527722; _idan poziva Bogovie`a k
preverjanju morebitnega dampinga pri svinjini, DNEVNIK (May 3, 2012), http://
www.dnevnik.si/clanek/1042527199.
96. See Nejc Gole & Cveto Pavlin, Strabag postaja moe`an igralec, a tudi CGP, DELO
(Feb. 6, 2013), http://www.delo.si/gospodarstvo/podjetja/strabag-postaja-mocan-igralec-a-
tudi-cgp.html.
97. See, e.g., Antidumping, in P. CRAIG & G. DE BURCA, EU LAW: TEXT, CASES, AND
MATERIALS 51 (2002).
98. See generally MICHEL WEDEL & WAGNER A. KAMAKURA, MARKET SEGMENTA-
TION: Conceptual and Methodological Foundations (2000).
99. MARKETING JOURNAL, http://mittalibharti.blogspot.com/2013/10/segmenting-
targeting-and-positioning.html (last visited Oct 24, 2016) (“Depending on the specific charac-
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It is no secret that many goods, not just luxury goods, are generally
cheaper in Eastern Europe than in Western Europe and cheaper in the
periphery than they are at the center of the Union.100 The figures listed in
the tables below shed some light on how market segmentation occurs on
the center–periphery axis within Europe.
Car price – VW Polo
Country Indicative price,
Slovenia (periphery) 8014
Cyprus (periphery) 8094
Greece (periphery) 8231
Malta (periphery) 8999
Poland (periphery) 9045
Estonia (periphery) 9102
Finland (center) 9343
Ireland 9537
The Netherlands (center) 9766
Spain 9916
France (center) 9933
Belgium (center) 10039
Italy 10096
Luxembourg (center) 10215
Austria (center) 10228
Germany (center) 10315
Slovakia (periphery) —
teristics of the product, these subsets may be divided by criteria such as age and gender, or
other distinctions, like location or income.”); MIDLANDS STATE UNIVERSITY, Market Seg-
mentation, https://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&ved
=0ahUKEwjXxcyNmY_TAhUiwYMKHa0WBvoQFggcMAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.
msu.ac.zw%2Felearning%2Fmaterial%2F1314871820Market%2520segmentation%2520
COPY%2520E-L.docx&usg=AFQjCNFhI7oqhS2PoABVqNQC5xWZwyERcQ&sig2=2Ssn
D3yHndm4BCsnspOlJA&cad=rja (last visited Oct. 24, 2016)
Consumer-based market segmentation can be performed on a product-specific ba-
sis to provide a close match between specific products and individuals. However, a
number of generic market segment systems also exist. For example, the system
may provide a broad segmentation of the population of a country or territory
based on statistical analysis of household and geodemographic data.
Geographic information is very often indeed fundamental in the process of planning and
implementing marketing activities.
100. See European Commission, Eurostat, Consumer Prices Research, An Experimental
Analysis into the Measurement of Indicative Price Levels for Consumer Products, Fourth Pilot
(2012). In this article, I am only giving some examples of the lower prices in the periphery.
Several other examples are provided in the Eurostat study. However, it should not be as-
sumed that prices in Europe are always lower in the periphery. For example, the Ikea Billy
Index shows that some prices in the periphery are higher than in the center. See Catherine
Bosley & Kristian Siedenburg, Ikea Keeps Lid on Billy Prices as Euro Inflation Weakens,
BLOOMBERG (Oct. 18, 2013), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2013-10-17/ikea-
keeps-lid-on-billy-prices-in-europe-as-inflation-weakens.
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Men’s blue jeans
Country Indicative price,
Bulgaria (periphery) 29,82
Hungary (periphery) 30,96
Malta (periphery) 31,38
Czech Republic (periphery) 37,86
Lithuania (periphery) 39,28
Slovakia (periphery) 46,74
Croatia (periphery) 47,16
Slovenia (periphery) 49,21
Cyprus (periphery) 49,28
Belgium (center) 56,02
Italy 61,57
Austria (center) 64,91
The Netherlands (center) 72,13
United Kingdom (center) —
Spain —
Romania (periphery) —
Poland (periphery) —
Luxembourg (center) —
Latvia (periphery) —
Ireland —
Germany (center) —
Finland (center) —
Estonia (periphery) —
Loaf of white bread
Country Indicative price,
Bulgaria (periphery) 0,72
Czech Republic (periphery) 0,89
Hungary (periphery) 0,95
Romania (periphery) 1,00
Poland (periphery) 1,07
Lithuania (periphery) 1,61
Ireland 1,62
Croatia (periphery) 1,64
The Netherlands (center) 1,68
Latvia (periphery) 1,68
Cyprus (periphery) 1,74
Slovenia (periphery) 1,85
United Kingdom (center) 2,05
Malta (periphery) 2,06
Belgium (center) 2,76
Spain 2,79
Italy 2,86
Luxembourg (center) 3,88
Finland (center) 3,96
Austria (center) 5,36
Germany (center) —
Estonia (periphery) —
Slovakia (periphery) —
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Fresh tomatoes
Country Indicative price,
Bulgaria (periphery) 1,02
Romania (periphery) 1,24
Cyprus (periphery) 1,29
Estonia (periphery) 1,39
Lithuania (periphery) 1,40
Czech Republic (periphery) 1,43
Malta (periphery) 1,44
Poland (periphery) 1,46
Hungary (periphery) 1,67
Slovakia (periphery) 1,68
Latvia (periphery) 1,73
Slovenia (periphery) 1,81
Croatia (periphery) 1,81
The Netherlands (center) 1,91
Belgium (center) 1,93
Luxembourg (center) 2,07
Finland (center) 2,10
Italy 2,32
Austria (center) 2,55
Germany (center) —
Spain —
United Kingdom (center) —
Ireland —
Potatoes
Country Indicative price,
Poland (periphery) 0,33
Latvia (periphery) 0,40
Lithuania (periphery) 0,41
Estonia (periphery) 0,47
Romania (periphery) 0,49
Bulgaria (periphery) 0,58
Hungary (periphery) 0,65
Czech Republic (periphery) 0,65
Slovakia (periphery) 0,69
Croatia (periphery) 0,70
Malta (periphery) 0,74
Cyprus (periphery) 0,76
Slovenia (periphery) 0,82
The Netherlands (center) 1,03
Finland (center) 1,04
Italy 1,11
Spain 1,14
United Kingdom (center) 1,15
Belgium (center) 1,26
Luxembourg (center) 1,39
Austria (center) 1,41
Ireland —
Germany (center) —
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Mineral salt
Country Indicative price,
The Netherlands (center) 2,28
Finland (center) 2,35
Poland (periphery) 2,47
Latvia (periphery) 2,47
Bulgaria (periphery) 2,47
Malta (periphery) 2,53
Estonia (periphery) 2,71
United Kingdom (center) 2,77
Slovakia (periphery) 3,12
Italy 3,13
Lithuania (periphery) 3,20
Austria (center) 3,24
Croatia (periphery) 3,36
Slovenia (periphery) 3,53
Belgium (center) 3,55
Hungary (periphery) 3,74
Luxembourg (center) 4,84
Cyprus (periphery) 4,99
Ireland —
Romania (periphery) —
Czech Republic (periphery) —
Spain —
Germany (center) —
Cigarettes
Country Indicative price,
Bulgaria (periphery) 2,45
Lithuania (periphery) 2,46
Latvia (periphery) 2,73
Croatia (periphery) 2,73
Estonia (periphery) 2,78
Czech Republic (periphery) 2,89
Romania (periphery) 2,93
Slovakia (periphery) 3,04
Hungary (periphery) 3,12
Slovenia (periphery) 3,66
Cyprus (periphery) 4,00
Malta (periphery) 4,33
Austria (center) 4,41
Luxembourg (center) 4,42
Italy 4,83
Germany (center) 5,14
Belgium (center) 5,59
The Netherlands (center) 6,14
Ireland 9,34
United Kingdom (center) 9,50
Finland (center) —
Sweden (center) —
Denmark (center) —
France (center) —
Spain —
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Hungary (periphery) —
Greece (periphery) —
Poland (periphery) —
Cinema ticket
Country Indicative price,
Croatia (periphery) 3,37
Bulgaria (periphery) 3,89
Slovakia (periphery) 3,91
Poland (periphery) 4,06
Czech Republic (periphery) 4,42
Lithuania (periphery) 4,44
Hungary (periphery) 4,62
Slovenia (periphery) 5,35
Malta (periphery) 5,65
Italy 7,82
Germany (center) 7,83
Cyprus (periphery) 8,00
Luxembourg (center) 8,14
Belgium (center) 8,70
Austria (center) 8,76
Ireland 8,99
The Netherlands (center) 9,16
Finland (center) 11,26
United Kingdom (center) —
Spain —
Romania (periphery) —
Latvia (periphery) —
Estonia (periphery) —
Daily newspaper
Country Indicative price,
Romania (periphery) 0,37
Bulgaria (periphery) 0,39
Slovakia (periphery) 0,45
Lithuania (periphery) 0,47
Hungary (periphery) 0,55
Poland (periphery) 0,58
Czech Republic (periphery) 0,67
Malta (periphery) 0,69
Croatia (periphery) 0,92
Austria (center) 1,00
Belgium (center) 1,18
Slovenia (periphery) 1,31
Italy 1,33
Luxembourg (center) 1,35
The Netherlands (center) 1,58
Cyprus (periphery) 1,74
Latvia (periphery) 1,98
Germany (center) 2,11
United Kingdom (center) —
Spain —
Ireland —
Finland (center) —
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Estonia (periphery) —
Cup of coffee
Country Indicative price,
Bulgaria (periphery) 0,56
Hungary (periphery) 0,84
Czech Republic (periphery) 0,89
Lithuania (periphery) 0,92
Italy 0,93
Slovakia (periphery) 0,95
Croatia (periphery) 0,98
Romania (periphery) 1,01
Slovenia (periphery) 1,17
Poland (periphery) 1,21
Malta (periphery) 1,46
Cyprus (periphery) 1,88
Germany (center) 1,91
Belgium (center) 2,02
Finland (center) 2,05
The Netherlands (center) 2,19
Luxembourg (center) 2,26
United Kingdom (center) 2,37
Austria (center) 2,61
Sweden (center) —
Spain —
Portugal (periphery) —
Latvia (periphery) —
Ireland —
Greece (periphery) —
France (center) —
Estonia (periphery) —
Denmark (center) —
White sugar
Country Indicative price,
Poland (periphery) 0,86
Croatia (periphery) 0,89
Hungary (periphery) 0,93
Czech Republic (periphery) 0,93
Germany (center) 0,94
Spain 0,99
The Netherlands (center) 1,04
Belgium (center) 1,04
Estonia (periphery) 1,06
Bulgaria (periphery) 1,07
Slovenia (periphery) 1,08
Romania (periphery) 1,08
Slovakia (periphery) 1,09
Lithuania (periphery) 1,12
Finland (center) 1,13
Latvia (periphery) 1,14
United Kingdom (center) 1,15
Italy 1,15
Austria (center) 1,20
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Luxembourg (center) 1,27
Malta (periphery) 1,32
Cyprus (periphery) 1,32
Ireland 1,35
How can this difference in markets be exploited? The price elasticity
of demand measures how much the quantity demanded of a good changes
when its price changes.101 The more elastic the demand curve facing the
firm, the more limited the extent to which a firm can increase prices. A
company might decide to use different pricing systems on the market of
the center and of the periphery, raising the price in the center where the
purchasing power is higher and reducing it in the periphery, increasing its
profit margins. The reduction in quantity sold in the center because of the
higher price is outweighed by the increased quantity a company sells in the
periphery.
An increase in price is accompanied by a reduction in the level of
sales. What is true for an individual consumer is true for the market as a
whole; the market demand curve is the aggregation of individual demand
curves. In a market with a lower purchasing power, the increased price will
result in a lower demand more quickly than in a market with high purchas-
ing power. This is the case particularly for luxury goods, but also for essen-
tial necessities. Consumers on the market with lower purchasing power
have a higher elasticity of demand. They react to a change of price more
radically than consumers on the market with higher purchasing power.102
The quantity lost as a result of a higher price set in the center, in a market
with higher purchasing power, is therefore offset by the increased quantity
sold as a result of a lower price on the market with lower purchasing
power. The price differences therefore can be exploited. As it will be fur-
ther argued below, this enables a select privilege to harm companies of the
European center with potentially devastating consequences for companies
of the periphery.
III. DUMPING IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE
To further portray the “dumping practices of the center” phenomenon
in the European Union, I will first explain how dumping is understood in
international trade. There is a continuing debate in international economic
law as to which trade policies and practices are fair and which are to be
prohibited. Dumping has been at the heart of these debates. Many coun-
tries have long feared that their industries would suffer from foreign com-
petitors selling at low prices. Dumping has been widely recognized as an
undesirable practice since the early twentieth century and multilaterally,
since the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) Uruguay
101. See, e.g., PAUL A. SAMUELSON & WILLIAM D. NORDHAUS, MICROECONOMICS, 64
(16th ed. 1998). Here, I am using Samuelson’s analysis of price elasticity with regard to
changes in prices in certain goods with the increase in prices of certain goods and applying it
to the elasticity of demand according to purchasing power of particular markets.
102. Kukovec, Law and the Periphery, supra note 41, at 410.
26 Michigan Journal of International Law [Vol. 38:1
Round. Dumping has been considered a trade practice that leaves domes-
tic producers defenseless and could lead to the disappearance of domestic
production of the merchandise at stake.103 Today, antidumping proceed-
ings are increasing rapidly. Antidumping action was initially implemented
by developed countries, such as the United States, Australia, New Zea-
land, and countries in the European Union, but there has also been an
increased enforcement of antidumping in emerging markets, such as India,
China, Turkey, Brazil, Argentina, Mexico, and South Africa.104
Dumping is an action of private firms of manufacturers, not govern-
ments.105 However, it is recognized that governments enforce other mar-
ket-restrictive measures that enable market segmentation, which allow
exporters to maintain higher prices in their home market. Dumping is pos-
sible by market segmentation. It is considered that companies can apply
different prices between domestic and export sales when their home mar-
ket is not freely accessible to imports while the export markets are accessi-
ble to imported goods in question.106 The profits gained in restricted
markets allow companies to reduce their export prices even below (full)
cost of production to gain market share and increased economies of scale.
Dumping is usually defined as “exporting at prices below those
charged on the domestic market (or, if none, on a third-country market).
This is called international price discrimination.”107 Internationally, price
discrimination may occur when demand in the export market is more elas-
tic than it is in the domestic market (i.e., consumers are more responsive
to lower prices). It has become accepted internationally that antidumping
laws may also apply when an agent exports goods at prices that do not
cover the cost of production. Dumping can thus also constitute selling at
prices below those necessary to cover production costs (below cost
sales).108 This type of dumping can be beneficial to exporters “even in
situations where their domestic sales are made at a loss, as long as export
prices exceed variable costs. Thus, dumped exports help to reduce the ex-
porter’s per unit cost of production.”109
A. Rationale for the Prohibition of Dumping
Important income or distributional effects result from dumping. It is
assumed that dumping makes the producer in the higher-priced market
103. See JOHN H. JACKSON, WILLIAM J. DAVEY & ALAN O. SYKES JR., LEGAL
PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS, CASES, MATERIALS AND TEXTS, 684
(4th ed. 2002).
104. See Wu, supra note 58, at 117; see also WOLFGANG MU¨LLER, NICHOLAS KHAN, &
TIBOR SCHARF, EC AND WTO ANTI-DUMPING LAW 3 (2d ed. 2009).
105. See MU¨LLER, KAHN & SCHARF, supra note 104, at 3; Wu, supra note 58, at 108.
106. Kukovec, Law and the Periphery, supra note 41, at 410 n.72.
107. Id. at 420.
108. Id.; see also JACKSON, DAVEY & SYKES, supra note 103, at 686.
109. Kukovec, Law and the Periphery, supra note 41, at 420 n.67.
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better off and the consumers worse off.110 But it is not universally as-
sumed that the economy itself is worse off overall. The producer that oper-
ates price discrimination will likely increase its output to supply the lower-
priced market. This result would usually be viewed as desirable because it
offsets the undesirable supply-restricting behavior that would otherwise
occur.111
However, even when price discrimination is not harmful to the world
as a whole, it has important distributional consequences. It may benefit
one economy and harm another one.112 In economic theory, it is generally
accepted that dumping does not have any significant negative effect on the
exporting economy.113 If dumping does harm to the exporting economy, it
is because of an adverse effect on price levels in that economy. Dumping
could also harm users of the dumped product who live in the exporting
country. This harm may transpire only if the dumped product is a compo-
nent of a final product. The users of the dumped product in the importing
country will have a cost advantage because of their access to the lower-
priced product.114 These users may be able to sell a final product that in-
corporates the dumped component more cheaply, thereby gaining an ad-
vantage over competing producers in the exporting country. This
advantage would be contingent on the importance of the dumped compo-
nent in the cost of the ultimate product as well as on the extent of the
competition among producers in both nations.115
According to Jackson, Davey, and Sykes, harm to the exporting econ-
omy is unclear, on balance. However, it is likely that the benefits to the
dumping company outweigh possible losses to the consumers at home.116
“Much more telling is the fact that exporting countries have generally not
thought it worthwhile to control dumping, which strongly suggests that
dumping does not have any significant adverse effect on the exporting
country.”117
Rather, the rationale for prohibiting dumping is provided by the effect
of dumping on the country where these goods are imported. It is generally
agreed in economic theory that consumers in the importing country will
benefit (at least in the short run) from the lower prices resulting from
110. William J. Davey, Antidumping Laws: A Time for Restriction, in ENFORCING
WORLD TRADE RULES: ESSAYS ON WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT AND GATT OBLIGA-
TIONS 268 (2006); see also Christopher L. Erickson & Sarosh Kuruvilla, Labor Costs and
the Social Dumping Debate in the European Union, 48 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 28, 28
(1994).
111. Davey, supra note 110, at 268.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 271.
114. Farrukh Khan, Dumping as an Economic Phenomenon, at 50 (Oct. 13, 2014),
https://www.scribd.com/document/242811618/Dumping-in-Managerial-Economics. See also
JACKSON, DAVEY & SYKES, supra note 103, at 680.
115. Khan, supra note 114, at 50.
116. JACKSON, DAVEY & SYKES, supra note 103, at 684.
117. Davey, supra note 110, at 270.
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dumping. It is likewise agreed that producers in the importing country who
compete with the dumpers will incur harm due to the loss of market share
to the dumpers.118 Thus, dumping has a significant potential to harm ex-
isting or potential industry in the importing country. Moreover, goods
dumping can negatively affect the investment climate in the importing
market. This can happen especially in an economic downturn and in capi-
tal-intensive industry characterized by a high sunk investment and rela-
tively low variable cost.119
B. Conditions for the Imposition of Antidumping Duties
First, antidumping laws allow a country to impose temporary counter-
vailing duties on dumped goods, dumped either as a result of price dis-
crimination or by below-cost sales. Under the GATT rules, the unfair
price is determined by the product’s standard of “normal value.”
According to Article VI of the GATT, a product is to be considered as
being introduced into the commerce of an importing country at less than
its normal value, if the price of the product exported from one country to
another
(1) is less than the comparable price, in the ordinary course of
trade, for the like product when destined for consumption in
the exporting country; or
(2) in the absence of such domestic price, is less than either:
(i) the highest comparable price for the like product for ex-
port to any third country in the ordinary course of trade;
(ii) or the cost of production of the product in the country of
origin plus a reasonable addition for selling cost and
profit.
Second, dumping is deemed to be an unfair business practice when it
causes injury. Article VI of the GATT authorizes the imposition of an-
tidumping measures to offset dumping if it causes material injury to a do-
mestic industry. However, before antidumping duties can be imposed by
the aggrieved country under WTO law, the importing nation must deter-
mine that imports of dumped merchandise have caused material injury, or
threatened material injury, to the domestic industry producing the like
product, or that the imports are materially retarding the establishment of a
domestic industry.
Indeed, the spectrum of injury by dumping practices can be quite
broad. This is why countries adopt a broad definition of dumping. For in-
stance, to impose antidumping duties under U.S. law, it is necessary that
the U.S. International Trade Commission find that imports of merchandise
sold at less than fair value have materially injured, or threatened to mate-
118. Id. at 271. See also Erickson & Kuruvilla, supra note 110, at 28.
119. Kukovec, Law and the Periphery, supra note 41, at 420-21. See also MU¨LLER,
KHAN & SCHARF, supra note 104, at 9.
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rially injure, a U.S. industry producing a like-product or are materially
retarding the establishment of a U.S. industry that may not yet exist.
Third, the proceeding section inquires whether the unfairly traded im-
ports cause or threaten material injury, or retard the establishment of a
new industry. If injury or threat is present, its cause must be determined as
the third stage of the analysis.120
IV. DUMPING OF THE EUROPEAN CENTER
A. Effects on the Actors of the Center
As set forth, then, dumping generally has three basic features: (1)
price discrimination or below-cost sales, i.e., selling at less than a good’s
normal value; (2) injury to the importing economy or threat of such injury;
and (3) proof that selling at less than a good’s normal value causes this
injury or threat of such injury. All of these features are present in the
doctrine that I have termed “dumping practices of the center.” I will now
turn to the explanation of the benefit and injury of goods dumping on the
internal market, without explicitly addressing the notion of causation, as
proving causation is a matter of factual proof in any individual case.
Dumping can be clearly advantageous for an individual exporter. A
profitable home market enables the exporter to operate in export markets
at prices much lower than would have been possible without market seg-
mentation. “The low export prices generate further sales, which in turn
lower the costs of production––an advantage which benefits both exports
and home sales.”121 The expansion of the center’s industry to the periph-
ery, while harming the periphery’s competition, thus benefits both exports
and sales at home, thus generating further sales and lower costs of produc-
tion. Lower production costs also enable a company of the center to de-
crease its price there, which shields such companies both from competitors
that may not engage in dumping to the periphery as well as from potential
parallel imports into the center. In Gunnar Myrdal’s language, the virtu-
ous cycle of production of the companies of the center is thus ensured.122
An additional benefit of dumping for the exporting country’s economy
is that its industries develop production capacities far larger than the size
of the national market. The exporting country’s economy benefits from
high economic growth and high production levels, even when faced with a
domestic or world-wide recession.123 Furthermore, it facilitates strategic
targeting of key industrial sectors in important markets. This can result in
a high trade surplus and possibly dominant positions in the industrial sec-
tors concerned.
120. See WTO Antidumping Agreement ¶ 3.5 (Agreement on Implementation of Art.
VI of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994).
121. Khan, supra note 114, at 49.
122. See GUNNAR MYRDAL, ECONOMIC THEORY AND UNDER-DEVELOPED REGIONS
26-27 (1957).
123. Khan, supra note 114, at 50.
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Dumping can even be beneficial in situations where home market
sales are made at a loss. As long as the latter cover fixed costs, export sales
can be priced as low as variable cost. This allows production and employ-
ment to be maintained in a recession. It also enables considerable advan-
tages in terms of economies of scale.124 Companies with a sanctuary
market can thus export recession to countries or regions with companies
without such a sanctuary market, thereby destabilizing such economies.
The European Commission’s report on dumping125 gives an example
of how a dumper retains production and employment in its home market
despite falling demand or increased competition. This example depicts the
ability of the companies of the center to harm, if not consistently destroy,
the periphery’s industries.
Dumping is profitable for exporters even where their domestic prices
are made at a loss. Imagine an exporter that produces 1000 units with fixed
costs of 7000 and a variable cost of 3 per unit, which would imply a
breakeven price of 10.126 In a period where demand and prices fall, per-
haps due to a recession or increased competition, the exporter can only
sell 800 units on the home market at a price of 8.75, a level that would
cover fixed costs but leave a loss of 2.400. In this position, dumping abroad
would permit an exporter to:
a) maintain employment and production by selling 800 domesti-
cally at a price of 8.75 and exporting the remaining 200 at the
variable cost of 3, without increasing overall loss;
b) maintain employment and production by selling 800 domesti-
cally at a price of 8.75, export the remaining 200 units at 6, and
thus reduce loss to 1.800; or
c) create more employment by increasing production to 1600
units, sell 800 domestically at a price of 8.75, and export 800 at
6; thus, through the increased production, the breakeven level
is reduced to 7.4, which makes home sales profitable to the ex-
tent that losses on export sales are offset (i.e., eliminate the
overall loss).
Even if a local producer were as efficient as the exporter initially, the
dumper’s attack would quickly propel it into a situation of failing prices,
declining sales, and increasing costs. The periphery’s producers are rarely
as efficient as their productivity is lower due to a number of factors, such
as, less developed logistics, services, inferior education structure, and so
on. Their position becomes the more difficult as the dumper may be able
to sustain losses on its export business for extended periods due to its
124. Id. at 49.
125. Eleventh Annual Report by the Commission to the European Parliament on the
Community’s Anti-Dumping and Anti-Subsidy Activities, COM (93) 516 final (Oct. 28, 1993).
126. The firm’s total costs would be 7,000 plus three times 1,000, or 10,000. To break
even, the firm must receive at least 10 on the 1,000 units produced to receive total revenue of
10,000 equal to its total costs.
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“guaranteed” home market profits.127 Furthermore, the cost increases as
well as the losses could also affect the periphery industry’s position in third
markets. As a result, the periphery industry’s productivity and investment
capabilities are weakened.
The total cost of dumping to the importing economy must be ac-
counted for in terms of lost capacities, lost investment, lost technology,
especially in promising or strategic sectors, as well as in the shrinking in-
dustrial base, the social cost of unemployment, and the contraction or
elimination of whole industries.128 Failing prices, fierce and powerful com-
petition of the (often) capital-laden and prestigious companies of the
center, declining sales, and increasing costs thus together work to create a
downward spiral for the periphery.
Companies in the center, on the other hand, have a platform upon
which to expand, increase production, employ workers, and increase in-
come and profits––all which contribute toward the center’s upward spiral.
The options available to the exporter stem from market segmentation and
the fact that fixed costs can be covered by sales at home; but, while compa-
nies of the center are established and thus able to charge high prices, com-
panies of the periphery do not enjoy such a luxury.
The center’s dumping might be short-term, aimed to secure market
entry, or longer-term, which may cause even greater injury to local pro-
duction. Dumping can be cyclical. According to Jackson, Davey, and
Sykes, cyclical dumping occurs in industries subject to periodic excess sup-
ply and capacity. In such industries, during the period of decreasing do-
mestic demand, the excess production is often dumped at prices below full
cost. This also leads to the export of unemployment.129 Dumping can also
be simply strategic. The goal of such dumping is to achieve a robust posi-
tion in key export markets. This strategy seeks to increase production to
benefit from economies of scale.130
The advantages derived from dumping can thus significantly outweigh
disadvantages stemming from protection of the home market, in particular
relatively high consumer prices. If dumping is not below cost, but is a re-
sult of mere price discrimination, the dumper, at best, incurs a relative
loss. It is actually difficult to speak in terms of loss at all, but rather a
smaller profit, in the short term. The smaller profit incurred by the
dumper is thus in the short term easily offset by the higher price charged
in the domestic, center market. In the long term, the smaller profit will be
well compensated by the market share a company of the center was able
to carve out in the periphery’s market.
127. JACKSON, DAVEY & SYKES, supra note 103, at 680.
128. Id.
129. See Eleventh Annual Report by the Commission to the European Parliament on the
Community’s Anti-Dumping and Anti-Subsidy Activities, supra note 125, at 9; JACKSON, DA-
VEY & SYKES, supra note 103, at 691.
130. See Eleventh Annual Report by the Commission to the European Parliament on the
Community’s Anti-Dumping and Anti-Subsidy Activities, supra note 125, at 9.
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B. Effects on the Actors of the Periphery
A domestic industry that faces dumped imports stands in a problem-
atic position, as it is confronted with powerful challengers selling at low
prices. “[D]umping often significantly injures the periphery’s industry pro-
ducing the like product,” often leading to a cease in production or slow the
establishment of such industry in the periphery.131
What are the periphery companies’ possibilities to retaliate and adopt
practices to keep out competition? Can they themselves engage in goods
dumping? One possible reaction to a competitor’s low prices would be to
sell on the center’s market at equally low prices. Companies of the periph-
ery could do this because there are no access barriers on the internal mar-
ket. However, reducing prices in a market with lower elasticity of demand
and increasing them in a higher-elasticity market makes little economic
sense.
So could periphery companies play the same game as companies at the
center? Could they engage in similar practices of price discrimination, in-
creasing their prices on center markets and reducing prices in the periph-
ery? They could, but their ability to raise prices in the center’s market
without losing market share is limited, and it also depends on the draw of
their existing market position. Their competitiveness in the markets of the
center is often not based on brand power or prestige, and they might have
limited resources to engage in powerful advertising campaigns. Rather, the
competitiveness of these companies is more often based on the lower
prices they can offer. Once they increase their low prices in the center,
their market position is weakened.
The center has a wealthy domestic sanctuary market with high
purchasing power to shield its companies and allows them to reduce prices
in the periphery. Center companies can also afford to charge relatively
higher prices in their home markets because they are relatively well-estab-
lished there. Competitive pressure certainly exists on the center’s markets;
while it may not always allow significant price increases, a higher priced
market at home nonetheless provides a powerful platform from which
companies of the center operate.132
The periphery lacks such a profitable home market––one that would
“provide a platform from which to operate in export markets at prices
lower than otherwise possible without market segmentation.”133 This pre-
vents periphery companies from lowering prices indefinitely in their do-
mestic markets. And they can rarely afford price wars, as their pockets are
often not as deep as those of the companies of the center.
131. Kukovec, Law and the Periphery, supra note 41, at 421.
132. One should note that monopoly is not at all necessarily free money to corpora-
tions, but has to be purchased. For example, Richard Posner has argued that there are costs
to monopoly profits–firms invest considerable sums of money in attempting to acquire mo-
nopoly profits and once they have them to retain them. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTI-
TRUST: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 11-12 (1976).
133. JACKSON, DAVEY & SYKES, supra note 103, at 679.
Fall 2016] Economic Law, Inequality, and Hidden Hierarchies 33
Operating from a sanctuary market can confer on exporters an advan-
tage that cannot be matched by their competitors in the importing country.
This provides the dumper with the opportunity to maximize profits or min-
imize losses, which can be highly injurious for the importing country’s
industry.
One could argue that exporting cheaper products to the center’s mar-
ket by peripheral companies paying lower wages to their workers is a form
of dumping already (despite the fact that this is, in the current literature
and regulatory regime, not perceived as dumping, but rather as a regular
practice of comparative advantage). But periphery companies, given their
lower productivity, can rarely afford to pay the same wages as the center’s
companies. As a result, the periphery indeed sometimes, but not always,
produces cheaper products because of the lower costs of labor. But lower
costs of labor are a decreasing cost for many industries,134 and are far
from the only cost that determines a product’s price. Instead, a company’s
competitiveness depends on a variety of factors, and often, though cer-
tainly not always, lower labor cost is the only factor in which periphery’s
companies have a comparative advantage.
Classical economic theory teaches us that restrictions in trade are neg-
ative, as factors of productions will not be put to their most productive
use. Furthermore, it teaches us that the losers will divert their production
to more efficient ends. Following this logic, the lower the pricing of the
center’s companies, the more the companies of the periphery will divert
production to a more productive use, and thus also benefit. The idea that
this approach benefits companies of the periphery, as they will reorient
production to a most efficient use, is based on an assumption about the
future that may or may not materialize. The company might simply close
down, and the unemployment of workers and disuse of other production
factors would ensue. This is not just a factual observation about the pos-
sibilities of people’s future reaction, which is difficult to predict, but a con-
ceptual one. And when there is a structure requiring the reorientation of
production, this logic becomes even more problematic.
According to Myrdal, an accidental change in a cause of events that is
not immediately cancelled out by the stream of events produces a different
reaction in a developed society than it does in an undeveloped society.135
In other words, competitors and communities in a wealthy economy have
a greater ability to adapt to competitive pressure than those in poorer
economies. A trade loss can elicit a creative response in a more advanced
economy given its higher human capital, better education, and denser clus-
ters of firms and networks of production as compared to poorer econo-
mies. According to Roberto Unger, the erosion of the entrenched position
may invite governmental, social, and private initiatives to enlarge the role
of the activities people do not yet know how to repeat, broadening access
to the opportunities and resources of production for more economic
134. ROBERTO M. UNGER, FREE TRADE REIMAGINED 130 (2007).
135. MYRDAL, supra note 122, at 23-38.
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agents.136 Thus, a wealthy economy can be more adaptable to change and
competitive pressure, which can even contribute to the upward spiral of an
already more advanced economy.
On the other hand, in a less advanced economy, loss from free trade
will present itself in a different key, with fewer resources and opportuni-
ties to respond through compensation, innovation, and reconstruction.
Furthermore, losers in a small economy will be compensated on a smaller
scale than they would be in an advanced economy. Moreover, the most
important form of loss, the inhibition of change, will not be compensated
even in principle. Firms and workers in the emerging economy will not
enter into lines of production in which the comparatively more advanced
economy maintains a solidified position. These losers do not yet exist.
They are prospective, not already prevailing economic agents,137 as the
existing dumping discourse already recognizes.
C. Incoherence of the Consumer Welfare Standard
The aim of competition law that many competition authorities have
increasingly stressed is the maximization of consumer welfare. Despite dif-
ferences in the approach of various regulatory jurisdictions as to how that
goal should be achieved and how to address consumer welfare,138 this con-
cept has become the dominant goal of U.S., EU, and South African anti-
trust laws.139 The relationship between competitors on the market in
current antitrust law thinking is thus resolved from the standpoint of an
imaginary consumer. The consumer has been reduced to someone whose
welfare increases when he or she pays as little as possible for a product.
This reductionism has become the benchmark according to which competi-
tion issues can be adjudicated.
Typically, price discrimination leads to lower prices for some consum-
ers and higher prices for others. Goods dumping appears to favor the con-
sumers and downstream producers of the periphery. They are said to pay
less for products than the center’s consumers and the downstream produc-
ers pay, and, in this analysis, they are likely to enjoy benefits from dumped
imports through low prices. From the perspective of the periphery, goods
dumping should thus be welcomed.
Indeed, some of the benefits of lower prices of goods may go to down-
stream producers in the periphery. The benefit to the downstream pro-
136. UNGER, supra note 136, at 126.
137. Id. at 127.
138. WHISH &  BAILEY, supra note 7, at 19-21. There has been a tension between two,
sometimes conflicting goals in EU law. EU competition policy takes account of market inte-
gration objective as well as the need for undistorted competition. A different approach of
U.S. antitrust authorities to particular cases has also sparked the critique that EU antitrust
laws protect competitors rather than competition. The debate about proper antitrust goals
was ignited every time the EU and U.S. competition authorities reached a different conclu-
sion in very important antitrust issues. See generally Damjan Kukovec, International Anti-
trust––What Law in Action? 15 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 1 (2004).
139. See WHISH & BAILEY, supra note 7, at 19.
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ducer is also considered by the European Commission in finally
determining the measures to counteract dumping in international trade.140
This is an additional criterion to be taken into consideration, and it en-
ables the European Commission to decide not to impose antidumping
measures if the overall economic interests in the EU should find such mea-
sures to be harmful. The interests of domestic industry producing the
product concerned, importers, Union industries that use the imported
product and would pay a higher price following antidumping measures,
and the interests of the end consumer of the product are taken into consid-
eration in this analysis.
On the internal market, dumping of the center, while having a nega-
tive impact on direct competitors, may thus have a positive impact on the
downstream producers of the periphery. Nonetheless, the value of lower
prices of inputs to the periphery’s downstream producers can be limited,
because it is more often the periphery that provides inputs for final prod-
ucts of the center, not vice versa, as peripheral companies generally find
themselves lower on the chain of worldwide productions.
Furthermore, the analysis reveals a larger problem of the consumer
welfare standard. Market economics assumes that consumers are “best off
if they can make voluntary exchanges of goods and services in competitive
markets.”141 Maximization of the consumer surplus seeks the largest net
gain of consumer when buying a product. Consumer surplus refers to the
difference between consumers’ valuations and the price they actually pay.
Producer surplus is the difference between the price producers are paid
for what they sell and the cost of production. Total welfare is the sum of
consumer surplus and producer surplus. When the price is elevated above
marginal cost, there is a deadweight loss, the sacrifice in total surplus for
units not purchased due to price elevation. From this perspective, lost con-
sumer surplus is the sum of deadweight loss and the amount transferred
from consumers to producers.
According to Herbert Hovenkamp, maximizing consumer welfare is
really a policy of maximizing everyone’s welfare, inasmuch as everyone is
a consumer.142 The benefit to consumers has been lauded as the main ob-
jective of antitrust enforcement in several jurisdictions.143 The U.S. Su-
preme Court has also consistently held that the Sherman Act protects all
victims of violations–not just the end users. The Areeda-Hovenkamp trea-
tise commented: “Every member of society is a consumer, while not every-
one is an entrepreneur, so the most ‘populist’ goal of all may be the one
that promotes consumer welfare.”144 Thus, according to Areeda and
Hovenkamp, “any interest group approach to antitrust is best off to recog-
140. See European Commission, Conditions for Imposing an Anti-Dumping Measure,
http://ec.europa.eu/trade/tackling-unfair-trade/trade-defence/anti-dumping/conditions.
141. HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ECONOMICS AND FEDERAL ANTITRUST LAW 1 (1985).
142. HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY 77 (2005).
143. See WHISH & BAILEY, supra note 7, at 19.
144. 1 PHILLIP E. AREEDA & HERBERT HOVENKAMP, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ANALYSIS
OF ANTITRUST PRINCIPLES AND THEIR APPLICATION ¶ 100b (rev. ed. 1997).
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nize ‘consumers’ as its protected class.”145 Therefore, Hovenkamp argues
“an antitrust policy of maximizing consumer welfare is really a policy of
maximizing everyone’s welfare, at least in their capacity of consumers.”146
However, one should not focus solely on the quantitative aspect and
the price of the good in measuring consumer benefit, without any regard
to the quality and nature of the product. Consumers of the periphery may
not necessarily be better off because domestic producers are forced to
lower production as a result of goods dumping of the center, or very often,
cease it altogether. Local competition and variety are thus reduced and
cherished local products are wiped off the market, all of which are unlikely
to serve consumer interest.
Moreover, and more importantly for the argument that consumer wel-
fare alone cannot serve as an apt goal of antitrust and trade policy goal,
each of us is a bundle of injuries and recognitions in every moment in time
that sets us into a particular situation in the hierarchical structure of pro-
duction of goods, services, knowledge, and so on.147 They constitute us as
subjects. We are injured not only as consumers, but also simultaneously as
workers, or as members of a particular community. In other words, the
imaginary consumer of antitrust law is the consumer who buys products,
not a consumer who earns money for their work. Neither the stand-alone
consumer welfare standard nor the total welfare standard take this into
consideration, as they consider a consumer and producer as detached from
each other. The difficulty of the analysis is not only hidden in the fact that
consumers are an internally fragmented group,148 but that consumer wel-
fare analysis untenably distinguishes between a consumer and a pro-
ducer.149 Reliance on the maximization of common interest between an
abstract class of consumers and abstract class of producers (elimination of
deadweight loss) in the calculation of maximization of welfare thus does
not give us a good account of the welfare we are producing.
While the consumer of the periphery benefits from lower price, he
loses money simultaneously as a producer or member of a community on a
downward spiral. Harm to the consumer employed by companies and liv-
ing under the constraints of local budgets that lose out as a result of the
structural downward spiral of their economies is missed in an understand-
ing of antitrust or trade law focused on consumer benefit.
What does the concentration of capital, technology, productive capac-
ity, and knowledge in the European center mean for the spiritual develop-
ment and economic and personal growth of the peripheral consumer? For
example, what does it mean for a young graduate unable to find suitable
145. Id. ¶ 100c.
146. HOVENKAMP, FEDERAL ANTITRUST POLICY, supra note 144, at 77.
147. See Kukovec, Hierarchies as Law, supra note 18, at 154.
148. See United States v. Brown Univ., 5 F.3d 658 (3d Cir. 1993). The Ivy League
schools implicated were Brown University, Columbia University, Cornell University,
Dartmouth College, Harvard University, Princeton University, the University of Penn-
sylvania, and Yale University. Id. at 662 n.1.
149. See Kukovec, Taking Change Seriously, supra note 24, at 329.
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employment in his own region or country, or for a worker who has been
made redundant, or whose salary is decreasing because he or she is paid
out of the budget of a community on a vicious cycle150 or for an artist
unable to get funding for his work? If a particular group of consumers is
structurally condemned to lower wages or unemployment because its
members are consumers of a peripheral economy, the fact that they pay
lower prices for products in their local shops may not necessarily favor
them.
On the other hand, a consumer in the center, who is paying a higher
price for products as a result of market segregation, appears to lose, but
gains at the same time as a producer. Success of the company that dumps
goods on the peripheral market does not only translate into the owner’s
benefits, but the labor force may appropriate part of the gain.151 Equity
interests may be owned by middle-income individual investors.152 Local
banks are not faced with defaulting credits when companies prosper and
technology, new ideas and practices may develop as a result of corporate
success.
The consumer welfare standard governs our thinking about antitrust
and trade law, despite the fact that it is based on untenable assumptions
and distinctions. Low consumer prices thus cannot be a sufficient indicator
of people’s well-being and cannot offer adequate normative guidance for
our decision-making. Moreover, the cost of living in the poorest countries
in the world, for those “consumers” confined to local conditions and stan-
dards, is the lowest,153 but hardly anyone aspires to such a living standard.
D. Predatory Pricing
One could think of other competition policy measures, aside from in-
ternational anti-dumping law per se, which might affect or restrain the de-
scribed practice of dumping of the center. For example, the doctrine of
predatory pricing. However, I argue that the practices I am describing are
not caught by any of the existing competition policy measures, which en-
sure that firms and governments are not able to implement or support
anticompetitive or market segmenting strategies. The doctrine of preda-
tory pricing, a doctrine of both EU as well as U.S. antitrust law,154 to-
gether with the general prohibition of other practices under the “abuse of
dominant position on the market”155 doctrine, is assumed to adequately
address the problem of low pricing abuse on the internal market. How-
150. MYRDAL, supra note 122, at 23-38.
151. Crane, supra note 36, at 1186.
152. Id. at 1187.
153. See, e.g., NUMBEO, Cost of Living Index for Country 2016 Mid Year, http://
www.numbeo.com/cost-of-living/rankings_by_country.jsp (last visited Oct. 24, 2016).
154. See generally ELHAUGE & GERADIN, supra note 14; WHISH & BAILEY, supra note
7, at 770.
155. See e.g., WHISH & BAILEY, supra note 7, at 361.
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ever, the prohibition of predatory pricing, specifically,156 does not cover
the center’s goods dumping as I have described it. Even a cursory analysis
reveals why. In current antitrust thinking, selling below cost or price dis-
crimination is considered to be harmful and actionable only if it is prac-
ticed with the intention of driving domestic firms out of business and
(re)establishing a dominant position on the market.157 The concern about
predatory pricing is that firms might strategically cut prices to unprofitable
levels in the short term to eliminate or discipline rivals and then raise long-
run prices to supracompetitive levels, inflicting a net long-term injury on
consumers. The problem is that such harmful predatory pricing is often
hard to distinguish from desirable competitive price-cutting.158
Prohibition of predatory pricing, targeting either specific below-cost
or particular above-cost anticompetitive activities, prohibits abusive ac-
tions of an already dominant player on the market under Article 102 of
the Treaty.159 Price reduction needs to be reactive to a market entrant and
usually must be below average variable cost.160 Predatory pricing there-
fore means abusive anticompetitive activity of an already dominant player
on a market, under the current understanding of dominance, who raises
back the price once it has driven a competitor out of the market.161
Dumping can be predatory (as some instances of dumping I described
above would be), but most dumping is not predatory. The practices of
dumping of the center are neither necessarily of a company with a domi-
nant position on a market, nor reactive to a new entrant to the market, nor
must they involve selling below average variable cost. Nor is there any
reason to think that unjustified harm of dumping occurs only when it is
proven that the price was, after the competitor has left the market, in-
creased to a higher level than its pre-predation level, as demanded by the
doctrine of predatory pricing.162 Dumping is not simply a predatory mech-
anism; it is a much more general practice that can cause harm within the
156. I am not addressing the entire body of rules under “abuse of dominant position”
under Article 102 of the Treaty nor the entire monopoly power under U.S. Antitrust Laws, as
those practices are generally more remote from the problem of goods dumping that I am
portraying than predatory pricing. For abuse of dominance position, see generally WHISH &
BAILEY, supra note 7, at 361.
157. ELHAUGE & GERADIN, supra note 14, at 382-83.
158. Id. at 353.
159. See e.g., Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art. 102, Dec. 1, 2009.
160. A typical example from U.S. antitrust law would be the case United States v. AMR
Corp. that involved the nature of permissible competitive practices in the airline industry
under the antitrust rules of this country, centered around the hub and spoke system of Amer-
ican Airlines (AA). The AA practice was alleged to be monopolizing or attempting monopo-
lization through predatory pricing in violation of Article 2 of the Sherman Act. However, the
government did not prove the pricing below AVC, but proposed a test that would imply the
price of average total cost, which the courts rejected. See United States v. AMR Corp., 335
F.3d 1109 (10th Cir. 2003).
161. See ELHAUGE & GERADIN, supra note 14, at 352.
162. Id.
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context of the European Union, and can particularly harm the actors of
the periphery.163
E. Arbitrage and Corrective Mechanisms
Provided that the companies’ home market is shielded against the
price drop that would neutralize price discrimination, dumping can have
clear advantages for the individual exporter. “Price discrimination is possi-
ble when a seller is able to identify separate markets for its product and
charge a higher price in a market that attaches a greater utility to the prod-
uct.”164 As a general rule, companies can use price discrimination, i.e.,
apply different prices between domestic and export sales, “when their
home market is not freely accessible to imports of the goods in question
while the export markets are”165––in other words, when markets are
segregated.
In international trade, a foreign producer enjoys a sanctuary home
market for a variety of reasons, including:
(a) the government’s unwillingness to enforce competition laws;
(b) excessively high tariff rates for the product, as compared to
other WTO members’ rates;
(c) non-tariff barriers to entry such as abusive industry norms,
standards, testing procedures, restrictions, or closed distribution
systems;
(d) the government’s implicit guarantee against continuing losses;
and
(e) market-distorting industrial policy.166
How can price discrimination be possible on the internal market? It is
assumed that people, goods, services, and capital circulate freely on the
European internal market and that the regulatory work, including its im-
plementation, is harmonized within the European Union. On this assump-
tion, the dumper can only discriminate or sell below cost provided that his
or her home market is shielded against arbitrage, i.e., resale or retaliation,
and a consequent price drop that would neutralize discrimination. Import
tariffs and measures of equivalent effect are strictly prohibited, and the
Commission and the European Court of Justice vigorously fight the re-
strictions of parallel imports and exclusive distribution systems.167
It is assumed that an integrated market is a very hostile environment
for those who attempt to make gains by sustained selling below cost. The
assumption is that on the integrated market, governed by the freedom of
163. See JACKSON, DAVEY & SYKES, supra note 103, at 686-87.
164. Khan, supra note 114, at 37. See also WILLIAM F. SAMUELSON & STEPHEN G.
MARKS, MANAGERIAL ECONOMICS (4th ed. 2003).
165. Kukovec, Law and the Periphery, supra note 41, at 421 n.72.
166. See Wu, supra note 58, at 166; see also JACKSON, DAVEY & SYKES, supra note 103,
at 691.
167. WHISH & BAILEY, supra note 7, at 639-41.
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movement of goods, services, capital, and people, which creates a level
playing field and gives maximum impact to the role of market forces, firms
are compelled to price in relation to efficiency.
Based on this assumption, there is little incentive to carry out a strat-
egy of below-cost selling or price discrimination on any other than a short-
term basis, given that competitors are free to retaliate with equally low
prices. Such a strategy would force prices down with no offsetting gain in
terms of increased market share. With these inbuilt constraints on unfair
pricing, competition rules can be restricted to maintain a level playing
field, through action, for example, against cartels or abuse of dominant
position.168 The general assumption in legal and economic theory is that
dumping is therefore not possible on the internal market.169
Under the conditions of the internal market, it is assumed that there
would only be room for very limited and short-term price discrimination
between different parts of the market, because this would lead to immedi-
ate arbitrage or retaliation by competitors. In other words, “there must be
some barrier between the markets so that the lower-priced goods are not
resold in the higher-priced market by an arbitrageur.”170
Vertical restraints are indeed designed to facilitate price discrimina-
tion against consumers.171 If, for example, a supplier sells at a higher price
in geographic markets where consumers are richer and willing to pay more
than consumers in poorer markets, the retailer in the poorer markets who
has the option of buying at a lower price can resell to the richer markets.
To prevent reselling, the manufacturer could impose vertical territorial re-
straints to prevent reselling to the richer markets and keep the markets
segmented.
Antitrust rules prohibit several vertical agreements. Prohibition of ex-
clusive distribution agreements and parallel imports are important parts of
the EU’s (or the United States’) antitrust mechanism. Exclusive distribu-
tion or exclusive dealership is a legal relationship in which a retailer is
given a guarantee by the manufacturer that no other retailer within its
geographic area will be supplied by that manufacturer. The supplier’s pur-
pose in granting exclusivity may be to provide the distributor with incen-
tives to promote the product and provide better service to customers, but
it may also enable price discrimination, because it does not allow others to
sell on this particular territory at a lower price.
Parallel import is the trade of products that takes place outside the
official distribution system set up by a particular firm. The prohibition of
parallel imports is indeed often a concomitant measure of the manufac-
turer toward exclusive distribution, because it ensures the exclusivity of a
particular dealer, but it may also be a measure independent of an exclusive
distribution agreement. Firms may charge different prices in different
168. See JACKSON, DAVEY & SYKES, supra note 103, at 689.
169. See, e.g., MU¨LLER, KAHN & SCHARF, supra note 104, at 11.
170. Khan, supra note 114, at 37.
171. WHISH & BAILEY, supra note 7, at 721 .
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countries, through their distribution system, exploiting differences in the
behavior of consumers.172 Parallel traders buy products in countries where
they are sold at lower prices to sell them in high-price countries. The flow
of products thereby created is called parallel trade.173
European Union law has always been opposed to the presence in ver-
tical agreements of territorial restrictions designed to prevent parallel
trade between Member States. Parallel trade, in fact, concerns a significant
amount of goods and services in certain economic sectors, such as motor
vehicles or drugs.174 It is stimulated by the price differences between
Member States, which are due to different factors such as taxation,175 la-
bor costs, and regulatory regimes, though the latter are becoming increas-
ingly similar under internal market rules.
In EU law, price discrimination has been viewed as causing significant
harm, especially when the price discrimination is among different national
markets. EU competition law has stressed the policy of creating a common
market that transcends national boundaries. This is why EU competition
authorities have been very strict in their evaluation of vertical agreements
and may have been stricter than the authorities of other jurisdictions. As
EU competition authorities are vigorously opposing such vertical agree-
ments, the argument is that the prohibition of vertical agreements pre-
vents price discrimination and works toward the equalization of prices in
the Union.
However, the conclusion that free movement and antitrust rules lead
to the equalization of prices in the Union is not borne out by the numbers.
As set out in section II above, the annual price review in the European
Union made by the Eurostat confirms that prices are often significantly
lower in the European periphery than they are in the center.176
The prohibition of vertical agreements does not necessarily lead to
price increases in the periphery and to price reduction in the center. It
does not prevent companies of the center from engaging in goods dumping
172. Parallel Trade, GLOSSARY OF COMPETITION TERMS https://www.concurrences.com/
en/droit-de-la-concurrence/glossary-of-competition-terms/Parallel-trade-parallel-imports
(last visited Oct. 24, 2016).
173. See WHISH & BAILEY, supra note 7, at 112.
174. See, e.g., Parallel Trade in Europe, EUR. ALLIANCE FOR ACCESS TO SAFE
MEDICINES, http://www.eaasm.eu/parallel-trade-in-europe (last visited Oct. 24, 2016).
175. It should be noted that the price differences that can be identified along the
center-periphery cannot be attributed to the differences in taxation alone. As for the VAT, it
is partially harmonized. See EUR. COM’N., VAT rates, http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/
taxation/vat/topics/rates_en.htm (last visited Oct. 24, 2016). The differences between VAT
rates in the EU are indeed too small to explain the price differences: See EUR. COM’N, Ex-
planatory notes on the EU VAT changes to the place of supply of telecommunications, broad-
casting and electronic services that enter into force in 2015 (Apr. 4, 2016), http://ec.europa.eu/
taxation_customs/resources/documents/taxation/vat/how_vat_works/telecom/explanatory_
notes_2015_en.pdf.
176. The Eurostat price report gives some examples from the report. In order to inform
consumers of different car prices in different EU countries, the European Commission annu-
ally issued a report on car prices. See European Commission, Eurostat, supra note 100.
42 Michigan Journal of International Law [Vol. 38:1
and harming the periphery. Why do prices remain different in the center
and in the periphery, or within the center and within the periphery despite
the internal market and despite the prohibition of vertical restraints?
First, parallel imports, which could potentially work toward the equal-
ization of prices, do not occur. There are various reasons for this. Consum-
ers or entrepreneurs may not be aware of price differentials due to the
lack of information. When prices are set by the state, they are made pub-
lic, and more transparent, and parallel imports are likely to follow from
them, as was the case in the GlaxoSmythKline case.177 When prices are set
by corporations, a greater effort is needed to discover price differences.
Furthermore, transaction costs present a large share of costs of any
activity as well as those costs, including transport costs, administrative
costs, and other opportunity costs, that might deter parallel trading. Via-
bility of parallel trading also depends on the type of goods and on the
existing segmentation within the markets of the center (and of the periph-
ery). It is more difficult to imagine arbitrage for luxury goods, which are
sold by licensed retailers in the center. For wealthy consumers, the option
of buying luxury products from non-licensed distributors is not an appeal-
ing option as it reduces their prestige and raises doubts about quality. Out-
let stores throughout the center often cater to the needs of its customers
who are willing to buy from less reputed retailers at a lower price, which
reduces the incentives for parallel trading. For perishable goods, parallel
imports are also generally a less viable option. It may not prove to be
profitable to transport perishable goods, such as Danone yogurt which is
produced in France or Austria, and shipped to, for instance, Romania, and
then back to France or to Sweden.
In addition, parallel importing, which could potentially work for the
equalization of prices does occur, but it does not result in a significant
price increase in the center. Even if parallel importing does occur, parallel
importers, who decide to pursue the business, will add transaction costs to
the equation, including transport and their own margin to the lower price
at which they buy a product. This again reduces pressure on prices in the
center. Furthermore, very often the markets of the periphery are smaller,
either in terms of population or purchasing power, and, when this is the
case, parallel imports would have a more limited effect on the larger mar-
kets of the center.178
177. Case C-501/06, GlaxoSmithKline Services Unlimited v. Commission of the Euro-
pean Communities, 2009 E.C.R. 2009 I-09291.
178. The dumper’s home market is further shielded against arbitrage or retaliation and
a consequent price drop that could reduce discrimination by the simple size of the center’s
market. Periphery’s markets in the European Union are generally smaller than the markets
of the center, not only in terms of population, but in purchasing power. The quantities from
the periphery resold on the center’s markets are therefore unlikely to have an influence on
the price in the center that would disable discrimination.
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F. The Shortfall of Parallel Imports Prohibition
The reason EU law encourages parallel trading is to allow factors of
production to move to the area where they are most valued, thus improv-
ing efficiency of the allocation of resources. This is assumed to also have a
positive impact on social goals such as employment, improving workers’
welfare, and so on. The goal is not necessarily to equalize prices, though
this is deemed to be the side effect of free movement provisions. Parallel
trading would enable the movement of goods to their most efficient use to
the center,179 where consumers allegedly value them more because they
are prepared to pay a higher price for them. This would result in a rise in
prices in the periphery and would reduce prices in the center.
However, any producer who wishes to raise prices in the periphery
would face an immense countervailing buyer power––the population’s low
purchasing power. Because purchasing power in the periphery is much
lower, higher prices would result in a rapid decrease of quantity of de-
mand—unless the goods are essential, in which case the elasticity of de-
mand is lower.
There is indeed strong pressure for low prices in the periphery, also at
the expense of quality. It is no secret that many center companies sell,
under their brand, products of a lesser quality on Eastern and Southern
European markets.180 Some companies in the center ship second-rate
goods to the periphery, or produce them at lower standards in the periph-
ery, under a brand of the center. Because some of these products are sold
under known brands––given that these companies have deep pockets to
finance their advertising campaigns and due to the lack of information of
the consumers living further away from the center countries––these com-
panies retain large market shares in the periphery, despite the fact their
products are of lower quality than the ones sold in the center’s markets.181
Consumers and consumer organizations have complained of the lesser
quality of a range of products sold on the Eastern market––some for the
same price and some for a lower price than products sold on the Western
market.182 These products are furthermore most often produced, based on
the right to relocation bestowed to companies from high-wage countries
179. See ELHAUGE & GERADIN, supra note 14, at 843.
180. For repetitive questions of members of the EU parliament to the European Com-
mission on this subject, compare Diogo Feio, Question for Written Answer to the Commis-
sion: Quality of Products Sold in the New Member States, EUR. PARLIAMENT, http://bit.ly/
2bjfEUd (last updated May 12, 2011) with Marc Tarabella, Question for written answer to the
Commission: Difference in the quality of the same product in different countries, EUR. PAR-
LIAMENT, http://bit.ly/2caXNkV (last updated July 3, 2013) (demonstrating repetitive
questions).
181. Some of these products were also particularly coveted before 1989 on the Eastern
side of the Iron curtain as they were difficult to obtain, which has given them an additional
competitive edge over local products. MICHAEL LUND, FROM KARL MARX TO TRADEMARKS,
http://www.lnd.dk/baggrund_oesteuropa.html (last visited Oct. 24, 2016).
182. See, e.g., Life, Lenor, Silan, Ornela – What?, MED.OVER.NET (Aug. 8, 2007), http://
med.over.net/forum5/read.php?151,4209022 (consumer discussing the quality of various de-
tergent brands available in the Eastern market).
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by EU law in a Viking case scenario,183 using cheaper labor in Eastern
Europe, which enables them to cut prices further.
G. The Underlying Reason for Market Segmentation
Prices in the Union cannot be equalized by the prohibition of vertical
agreements, i.e., “by the market.” Price differentials as well as wage differ-
entials throughout the Union depend on a number of factors, such as dif-
ferent tax systems or productivity. But one of the key factors for different
wages and prices in the EU is the difference in wealth between regions of
Europe, and this factor is widely absent from legal (and economic) analysis
of antitrust law.
Companies from the center do not need to segment markets by verti-
cal agreements. The territorial division of prices and different elasticity of
demand is already prepared for them by the massive difference in devel-
opment and wealth.184 They adjust their prices according to a preexisting
condition. Pricing is often made according to the level of economic devel-
opment of a country or a region, either by companies185 or by government
regulation, as in the GlaxoSmithKline case.186 Price segmentation is not
caused by territorial segmentation of the market by the actions of a partic-
ular agent. Lower prices in the periphery are due to the hierarchical deep
structure of the Union. The periphery has lower wages and lower prices of
products, and the actions of a single producer, independent of its position
on the market, have a very limited effect on this structural difference.
It would be therefore incorrect to conclude that markets in the Union
cannot be or are not segmented because of free movement provisions or
because of the prohibition of restrictions on parallel imports or exclusive
distribution agreements. These provisions may sometimes lessen such seg-
mentation, but they do not alleviate it. Keeping prices higher in the center
and lower in the periphery may only sometimes be more difficult because
of these provisions.
Market segmentation is not a consequence of a sporadic action of a
single dominant firm or of an act of government (as is generally the case in
international trade), as the latter action would be prohibited under the
free movement provisions (of goods, services, capital, or workers). Rather,
it is inherent in the structure of the Union internal market. Then the ques-
tion is—who is allowed by the legal system to take advantage of this
segmentation?
One of the goals of the single currency, the Euro actually was to en-
able direct price comparisons to be made of products in different coun-
183. See Kukovec, Law and the Periphery, supra note 41, at 425-26.
184. See e.g., List of European countries by GDP per capita, STATISTIC TIMES, http://
statisticstimes.com/economy/european-countries-by-gdp-per-capita.php (last updated Sept. 3,
2015).
185. See, e.g., GLOBALBRANDPRICES.COM, http://www.globalbrandprices.com/rankings/
Coca_cola/ (last visited Oct. 24, 2016).
186. See Case C-501/06, GlaxoSmithKline Services Unlimited v. Commission of the Eu-
ropean Communities, 2009 E.C.R. 2009 I-09291.
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tries.187 This would also lead to the lowering of price differentials in
different countries. Such gaps were deemed to be fueled, in part, by differ-
ent currencies. Nonetheless, the prices in the center simply reflect a higher
living standard, and many have remained higher long after the adoption of
the Euro.188
The European internal market does not only suffer from segmented
consumer markets; wage segregation is an obvious correlative phenome-
non that triggered the Laval and Viking judgments in the first place .189
Wages in the periphery are much lower than they are in the center.190 Just
as parallel imports and the prohibition of vertical agreements such as ex-
clusive distribution are not able to equalize prices in the Union, the free
movement of workers is unable to (if one would at all accept this as desira-
ble) equalize wages in the Union.
Wages and salaries remain higher in the center despite the fact there is
a free movement of workers in the Union. So why do people from the
periphery not just migrate and work in the center? Would Latvian workers
find a job in Sweden if their Latvian employer had not been awarded a
contract to perform works in Sweden, as in the case of Laval? Unless there
is a deficit of a particular kind of workers in the center, workers from the
periphery do not always easily compete with workers of the center, given
the differences in language, education, and so on. There are large struc-
tural, formal, and informal barriers at play that prevent the movement of
many workers, let alone the equalization of wages across the Union. The
parallel importation of a cheaper workforce, if it happens at all, has little
influence on the large disparity of wages or salaries in the Union. Migra-
tion of the workforce from the periphery can reduce wages in some iso-
lated sectors, but this does not translate to a general equalization of wages
across the Union.
Bela Balassa notes that national restrictions to migration hinder the
movement of labor, and that their elimination is a necessary, but not suffi-
cient condition, for achieving desirable labor movements. According to
Balassa, numerous sociological, psychological, and economic obstacles im-
pede migration. These stem from the migrants as well as the local popula-
tion.191 Differences in language, religion, customs, climate, educational,
medical and shopping facilities, cooking habits, and, in general, the loss of
the accustomed environment are some examples of sociological or psycho-
logical hindrances.192 “Job and wage insecurity, loss of seniority, and inad-
187. See e.g., Why the Euro?, EUR. COMM’N, http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/euro/
why/index_en.htm (last updated July 15, 2015).
188. See European Commission, Eurostat, supra note 100.
189. See supra Section II.
190. European Commission, Labour Market Developments in Europe at 143 (2013),
http://ec.europa.eu/economy_finance/publications/european_economy/2013/pdf/ee6_en.pdf.
191. BELA BALASSA, THE THEORY OF ECONOMIC INTEGRATION 90 (1961).
192. Id.
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equate housing facilities at the place of immigration” are some of the
economic obstacles.193
The effect of free movement of workers provisions on the equalization
of wages serves to further illustrate that perfect competition remains an
elusive ideal and that there are numerous obstacles in the market unre-
lated to tariffs or to what is usually understood as a barrier. Competition
law, by prohibiting exclusive distribution and allowing parallel imports,
cannot create perfect equality of prices and thus cannot be understood as
an excuse for allowing the practice of dumping on the internal market. In
other words, the EU legal profession cannot absolve itself of its responsi-
bility to protect the periphery from dumping by prohibiting limits on par-
allel imports and exclusive distribution agreements, and even less so by the
mistaken assumption that dumping is not possible on the internal market.
The idea that there is a free market as a basis for parallel imports to
equalize prices entails two false assumptions. Both assumptions build upon
the error of the other. First, that there is such a thing as a free market
without barriers. Second, that the European Union is already such a free
market in which there is equal access to all and that everyone inhabits the
same structural situation on the market.
Thus, it should be obvious that there is more at play here than the
nonexistence of a “perfect” market in which all factors of production are
completely free to move to the area where they are most valued.194 It is
the very structural differences inherent in the EU that reproduce the price
inequalities that have been my focus thus far (structural differences which
the creators of the Euro, by no coincidence, failed to account for).195 This
is to say that the purportedly single market of the EU is in fact a highly
differentiated and segmented market regulated by the consciousness of
the “single market” as seen from the EU’s center.
A “real” internal market free from barriers to trade is an illusion.
The EU internal market is not a constant advancement of free
movement considerations over social considerations, as EU law-
yers from both political poles would like to see it. Rather, it is a
complex set of entitlements allocated differently between differ-
ent actors in the Union. [In reality, the European Union internal
market] is, [as any market,] a single market in which some obsta-
cles to some movements are sporadically reduced and some obsta-
cles to some movements are added.196
193. Id.
194. For a general discussion questioning the theory of perfect competition, see WHISH
& BAILEY, supra note 7, at 7-10.
195. For commentary regarding the economic disadvantages of adopting a single Euro-
pean currency, see Martin Feldstein, Europe’s Monetary Union: The Case Against EMU, THE
ECONOMIST (June 13, 1992); Martin Feldstein, The Political Economy of the European Eco-
nomic and Monetary Union: Political Sources of an Economic Liability, 11(4) J. ECON. PERSP.
23 (1997).
196. See Kukovec, Hierarchies as Law, supra note 18, at 167.
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The central question of analysis should thus be not whether a regime
is or is becoming a freer trade regime or more akin to an internal mar-
ket––a more private or a more public regime––but whose obstacles in the
hierarchical structure are reduced and whose are increased.197
Factors of production are themselves a phenomenon with various em-
anations and regulation always affects them unequally. The legal system is
a plethora of compromises that have a very specific effect on the move-
ment of factors of production, but differently on different factors within
each group of factors of production. These compromises result in entitle-
ments that help some movements and deter others. Different capital,
workers, goods, or services are mobile differently as a result of the hierar-
chical structure of society. People have different legal entitlements de-
pending on their place in the hierarchical structure of society.
V. ARGUMENTS AGAINST DUMPING AND AGAINST LOW PRICING
Some international trade scholars would contest the idea that dump-
ing is at all harmful, which would also cast doubt on my own construction
of dumping. The desirability of using antidumping duties and prohibiting
price discrimination has been contested by some international trade law
scholars.198 The bedrock assumption is that the companies engaged in
dumping are behaving perfectly rationally by adapting their strategy to the
demands of the particular markets.199 Allocative efficiency is achieved
under perfect competition because producers, assuming they are acting ra-
tionally and have a desire to maximize profits, will expand their produc-
tion for as long as it is privately profitable to do so. Economic theory
teaches us that the appropriate price for a rational producer to charge is
the price at which marginal revenue from the sale of a product is equal to
its marginal cost, even though the additional revenue does not cover the
total cost of the product sold. This is why short-term, below-cost sales
under such circumstances are viewed as rational and not viewed as preda-
tory under antitrust laws.200 Below-cost sales in the short term are often
deemed as rational if marginal costs do not exceed marginal revenues and
should therefore not be controlled.201
It is deemed rational that a company may wish to set prices above
marginal cost to recover some fixed costs for those who are willing to pay
more, while setting prices at or near marginal cost for those who can only
afford to pay less to acquire the product or service in question. “So if mar-
ginal costs are, say, ten percent of the list price, and there is a customer
who is unwilling or unable to pay more than fifty percent of the list price
197. Id. at 168.
198. See, e.g., Wu, supra note 58, at 169-72.
199. See id. at 111.
200. Davey, supra note 110, at 276.
201. See generally id. Mark Wu takes a similar position to Davey. See Wu, supra note
58, at 110-12.
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for the product, it is in the interests of both the customer and the domi-
nant company to grant the fifty-percent discount.”202
In this description, everyone benefits. The dominant company obtains
revenues from the sale. The customer can afford to buy a product, which
he or she otherwise could not. Goods and services are apportioned among
consumers according to the price they are willing to pay. The transaction is
precompetitive and economically rational and its prohibition would harm
both consumers and producers. Economists thus do not tend to view price
discrimination with any particular suspicion. Rather, they perceive its ef-
fects as positive or at least not obviously anticompetitive.203
The displacement of one competitor by another is not considered
cause for concern according to international economic law and antitrust
economic theory, assuming that the prevailing competitor’s behavior is not
predatory. The argument is that if the price is not predatory, it should
benefit from a very strong presumption of legality, since it will generally
be procompetitive and based on efficient market behavior. There is thus
no reason to protect one set of competitors in preference to another set so
long as competition in the market is not affected.204 An objection to this
analysis could be that “failure to prevent below-cost sales will allow a re-
cession-bound economy to export recession to its trading partners.”205
Nonetheless, William J. Davey argues that, given the interdependence of
economies, it seems fairest to let the strongest companies survive, wher-
ever they are located, and to assist other competitors to adjust.206
Such thinking in economic theory has resulted in a recent trend to-
ward the normative maximization of costs (of the predator, or of the
dumping company) above which pricing is not perceived as predatory,207
or above which pricing is not perceived as dumping.208 According to this
thinking, the lower the boundary of permitted low pricing, the more the
consumer will benefit and the more welfare will be created.
In this line of thinking, Mark Wu critiques the existing standards of
dumping in international trade as inefficient and protectionist and argues
for its change.209 According to Wu, instead of requiring evidence of price
setting below average variable cost, international law currently only re-
quires evidence of price setting below the product’s “normal value,” a le-
gally constructed term defined as “the comparable price, in the ordinary
202. See generally JACKSON, DAVEY & SYKES, supra note 103.
203. John Temple Lang & Robert O’Donoghue, Defining Legitimate Competition: How
to Clarify Pricing Abuses Under Article 82 EC, 26 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 83, 89 (2002).
204. See generally Davey, supra note 110.
205. Id. at 277.
206. Id.
207. Einer Elhauge, Why Above-Cost Price Cuts to Drive Out Entrants Are Not Preda-
tory – And the Implications for Defining Costs and Market Power, 112 YALE L.J. 681, 826
(2003).
208. Wu, supra note 58, at 111.
209. Id.
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course of trade, for the like product.”210 Most often, argues Wu, “normal
value” equals the price charged by the foreign producer in its home mar-
ket. Thus, he continues, under the existing standard, any firm that charges
less for its product abroad than it does at home may be found guilty of
dumping.211
Wu further believes that firms that participate in this type of pricing
approach are behaving entirely rationally.212 A firm may be simply decid-
ing strategically to earn less profit in an export market than in its home
market. This happens primarily when the firm seeks to establish reputa-
tion in another country, or when its goal is a higher market share. The firm
may desire to exploit dissimilarities in the elasticity of demand across the
countries. “Provided that the firm is pricing above its average variable
costs, its behavior should not be considered problematic, and according to
economic theory, no remedy is necessary. Moreover, the net effect for the
importing country is often positive, since consumers experience welfare
gains from lower prices.”213
Thus, Wu argues, governments who are using antidumping measures
for imports sold above the average variable cost are acting as protection-
ists. They are “benefiting domestic producers at the expense of domestic
consumers and foreign producers, without an economic justification for
doing so.”214 “Rational,” non-predatory behavior should therefore not be
punished.215 Hence, current antidumping laws are an economically ineffi-
cient and protectionist instrument, which harms global welfare and leads
to unjust global consequences.216
This trend of thinking about low prices is also present in antitrust law.
Unless price-cutting is contained to the narrow scenarios of predatory
pricing, it is considered among the most desirable of business activities.
Einer Elhauge argues that the last thing of interest would be to enable
firms to use antitrust law to discipline rival price cuts.217
In the context of predatory pricing, Elhauge argues the benefit of
lower prices and proposes an even lower boundary of permitted low pric-
ing than Wu. According to Elhauge, if the capital-intensive firm has in-
creased output to displace its rival’s output, we should look only to the
higher variable costs of the allegedly predatory increase in output, not to
the lower variable costs of producing the predator’s entire output.218
Prices at or above those higher average variable costs cannot drive out a
rival that is equally efficient at making that increment of output. The rival
210. See WTO Antidumping Agreement, supra note 120.
211. Wu, supra note 58, at 111.
212. Id. at 102.
213. Id. at 111.
214. Id.
215. Id. at 112.
216. Id. at 106.
217. ELHAUGE & GERADIN, supra note 14, at 353.
218. Elhauge, supra note 207, at 713.
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output can more efficiently be supplied by an increase in the capital-inten-
sive firm’s output, although the capital-intensive firm may be exceeding its
optimal capacity.219
Reasoning in terms of the maximization of global welfare, in terms of
maximization of the pie, follows the ideas of Ronald Coase, as well as of
Guido Calabresi and A. Douglas Melamed,220 in terms of the optimization
of social cost. Coase rejected the Pigouvian formulation of the problem in
cases such as factory’s smoke emissions that have harmful effects on those
occupying neighboring properties. The economic analysis of such a situa-
tion has preceded in terms of a divergence between the private and social
product of the factory, which resulted in either taxing the factory owner
according to the damage the smoke caused, or making him or her liable to
those injured by the smoke. According to Coase, these courses of action
were inappropriate and led to the results which were not necessarily, or
even usually, desirable.221
Therefore, instead of attempting to somehow make the “private costs”
faced by the factory owner match the “social cost” of his or her activity,
Coase argues that the legal system should aim, in all cases of harmful ef-
fects, to maximize the value of production, taking into account the welfare
and conduct of all affected parties.222 We should consider a wide variety of
mechanisms by which harm might be mitigated or avoided. The goal
should be to choose the solution that yields the least costs. That cannot be
achieved on the basis of theory. Instead, it “has to come from a detailed
investigation of the actual results of handling the problem in different
ways.”223
However, efficiency and social cost are evaluated in a particular man-
ner by those who argue for the benefit of low pricing in dumping (as well
as in predatory pricing). The social benefit and optimization are consid-
ered in terms of a cost and benefit to an abstract company and an abstract
consumer, which misses the complexity of the hierarchical structure of so-
ciety. The existing debate on dumping and predatory pricing practices re-
volves, as in the discussions surrounding Laval and Viking judgments, in
terms of a universalized interplay of low prices and protectionism, in terms
of the universalized interests of companies and consumers.224 As such, it
does not give us a good sense of how antidumping law affects people’s
welfare in the European Union, of people in diverse hierarchical situations
in the legal structure.
As the practice of goods dumping that I am describing is generally
possible only by companies of the center and it affects consumers and
219. Id.
220. Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Ina-
lienability: One View of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972).
221. Coase, supra note 51, at 2.
222. Id. at 18.
223. Id. at 18-19.
224. See generally Kukovec, Law and the Periphery, supra note 41.
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companies of the periphery, abstract social welfare calculation in terms of
an abstract producer and an abstract consumer is not sufficient to deter-
mine the desirability of the regulatory regime that is being constructed,
and it leads to the mistaken perception of a desirability of low pricing.
When following the argument of cost minimization, the social cost
should not be constructed in the abstract. Rather, the question to be asked
is––whose efficiency considerations are taken into account and whose
claims of injury are being challenged? From whose perspective do we min-
imize costs? The choice we make should not be between economic effi-
ciency and protectionism (sometimes referred to as equity or justice in
contrast to efficiency); rather, the choice is between different constructions
of the legal system. In other words, instead of thinking in terms of a game
between efficiency/low prices and protectionism, dumping and antitrust
analysis should rather be made with a self-conscious awareness of one’s
understanding of injury inflicted on people in diverse structural positions
in society at any moment in time and the consequences the existing under-
standing of harm entail. In this approach, the starting point of normative
economic analysis should be the hierarchical structure of society, not the
minimization of social costs based on premises of assumptions of people’s
equality and universalization.
Davey has argued that unless we let the strongest companies survive
and assist others to adjust, it would require supporting domestic produc-
ers’ government-protected entitlement to a certain market position.225
However, those who are allowed to harm other producers in the current
regulatory setting have a government-protected entitlement to a certain
market position just as well. This becomes even more important when
there is a structure at play enforcing who can inflict injury––when only
companies of the center can profitably engage in the kind of dumping that
I am describing. Generally, the lower the permitted low price in a dumping
or predatory scenario is set, the greater the privilege of the companies of
the center to harm companies of the periphery and become more efficient
at their expense.
VI. COMPETITION ON THE MERITS?
There is no real “internal market” that one could aspire to con-
struct,226 just as there is no state of “perfect competition.”227 Both are a
matter of choice and construction,228 which cannot rely on reductionist
notions of consumer or producer welfare. No stage of economic integra-
tion or legal construction is inherently more public, more private, more
protectionist in the abstract. The question is rather, who is protected by
law in a particular structural situation. This also diverts the focus of inter-
national economic law inquiry away from considering borders and related
225. Davey, supra note 110, at 687.
226. Kukovec, Hierarchies as Law, supra note 18, at 167.
227. WHISH & BAILEY, supra note 7, at  7.
228. Kennedy, supra note 23, at 444.
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measures as the main obstacle to trade. The dilemma of antitrust and trade
law should not be understood as a choice between a consumer or total
welfare standard or between efficiency and protectionism, but whose
structural injury do we acknowledge and resist in legal and economic
analysis.
Companies in the center start from a position of dominance,229 which
is further reinforced by the EU legal structure. The center companies’ cost
structure is more efficient also because of the privilege to harm bestowed
on them and withheld from periphery companies. A competitor from the
periphery’s position differs because its ability to profitably engage in the
dumping described is hindered, or even impossible. Dumping and price
discrimination above average variable costs differently affects the cost
structure of companies precisely because of their structural position as
central or peripheral. Position enables economies of scale for companies of
the center as a company’s variable costs and average variable costs de-
crease when a company is able to lower prices profitably. Low export
prices generate further sales and improve economies of scale, which in
turn lower the costs of production.
On the other hand, dumping causes failing prices, declining sales, and
increasing average variable costs of production for periphery companies.
This prevents affected companies from expanding and consequently,
makes it more difficult for periphery competitors to enter the center’s
markets.
If the government decides to set the price prohibited by competition
law very low, this benchmark contributes to an upward cycle for compa-
nies from the center. If price discrimination and the consequent low prices
in the periphery are permitted, the bigger the upward spiral for companies
from the center. The same upward spiral for companies from the center
creates a symmetrical, but inverse, downward spiral for their competitors
from the periphery. For companies on the periphery, price discrimination
229. The power of companies of the center is, for example, pronounced in the case of
companies with brand names. The European periphery has very few brands known beyond
its borders, whereas the famous brands come from the center. For example, most brands
registered with the OHIM are from the companies of the center. See Statistics of Community
Trademarks, at 44 (last visited Oct. 24, 2016), https://oami.europa.eu/tunnel-web/secure/
webdav/guest/document_library/contentPdfs/about_ohim/the_office/SSC009-Statistics_of_
Community_Trade_Marks-2014_en.pdf. The European Union’s most valuable brands come
from the center. See Eurobrand Global Top 100, EUROBRAND (last visited Oct. 24, 2016)
http://www.eurobrand.cc/studien-rankings/eurobrand-2012/. The power of branded compa-
nies is significant. Non-branded companies typically earn smaller gross margins and are con-
stantly at risk of being undercut by cheaper rivals. Branded firms enjoy much bigger margins
and more loyal customers. Non-branded companies typically earn gross margins of three to
five percent and are constantly at risk of being undercut by cheaper rivals. Branded firms
enjoy much bigger margins (fifteen percent or more). Brand New, THE ECONOMIST (Aug. 4,
2012), http://www.economist.com/node/21559894. Non-branded companies typically earn
gross margins of three to eight percent, and are constantly at risk of being undercut by
cheaper rivals. It should be noted that I am not using the term “dominance” in the sense of
antitrust/competition law here.  It should be noted, however, that the usage of dominance in
this sense does not directly correspond to the technical term “dominance” of antitrust law.
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and internal dumping lead to higher costs, lower sales, stagnation, and pos-
sibly exit.
Moreover, Wu’s conception of harm is exacted on a universalized no-
tion of a consumer who buys products, not a consumer who simultane-
ously works to earn money to buy these products, and it does not take into
account the fact that dumping might be performed selectively, as in the
European Union. Wu’s reasoning gives, at least in the context of the EU
legal structure, companies of the center benefit from a reinforced privilege
to harm companies of the periphery, which in turn allows them to produce
at even lower costs and harm companies of the periphery even more.
The argument that when companies dump, they are only behaving
“perfectly rationally”230 combined with a concern for administrability of
the system231 thus cannot be a sufficient normative guide for the construc-
tion of the legal structure. It is by all means perfectly rational for firms to
wish to expand and harm other firms. But this does not mean that we
should yield to their particular interests and support an existing specific
pattern of simultaneous expansion and destruction in our societies that is
increasing welfare for some and decreasing the welfare of others. Wu’s
normative guidance is that allowing low pricing coupled with an ex post
facto “fairness” analysis is supposed to compensate for the possibility of
methodological manipulations permitted for calculating “normal value”
under existing law.232 But Wu’s normative analysis already has a particular
normative twist; and, at least, in the context of dumping in EU law, it
tends to harm the actors of the periphery.
Likewise, we might consider Baker and Salop’s suggestion that regula-
tory agencies might forgo using scarce resources for matters where the
bulk of harms are suffered by the rich. They cite luxury goods as an exam-
ple, such as fine crystal products or yachts,233 premium fountain pens,
gem-quality diamonds, stock brokerage services, auctioning of high-end
art, luxury automobiles, and skiing which are likely disproportionately
used by the well-to-do.234 Yet, what does an unfettered privilege to injure
of the corporations in the European center producing luxury goods mean
for the development of industry capacities in the periphery and for the
penetration of the luxury-products market of peripheral companies? What
privileges to harm will remain unnoticed in such analysis of antitrust and
trade?
Thinking about consumers only as the spenders of money, not as
workers or members of a particular community misses the daily dimen-
sions of our lives and leads to misleading appreciation of welfare. Simi-
larly, thinking about social dumping as a measure offering protection only
230. Wu, supra note 58, at 111.
231. Id. at 117. Mark Wu’s primary concern is that more and more countries are enforc-
ing anti-dumping legislation and that thus the system cannot continue to operate as it has.
232. Id. at 166.
233. Baker & Salop, supra note 6, at 17.
234. Id. at 19 n.65.
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to workers, also leads to a mistaken conclusion that social dumping harms
workers and goods dumping harms companies. In reality, those concep-
tions harm both workers and companies. The question remains––which
workers and which companies will be protected and which ones will be
harmed by the legal system? Current legal and economic thinking tends to
give preference to the interests of workers and companies of the center.
CONCLUSION
The existing antitrust and international trade debate does not ade-
quately address the complexity of the global hierarchical structure and
thus the complexity of privileges to harm that contribute to the reproduc-
tion of existing hierarchies in our societies. Current debates, like that be-
tween Salop and Baker with Crane, show both overstated optimism that
current antitrust thinking can capture reality, while contributing to intel-
lectual paralysis, limiting the potential for social transformation. Thus,
caution should be raised about current antitrust and trade law’s potential
as a tool for either inequality or economic growth.
Whose justice and growth is being constructed? There are different
ways to structure “competition on the merits” and choices with countless
alternatives are made in global antitrust and international trade govern-
ance. If social transformation is to be taken seriously, rather than resorting
to an unquestioned understanding of maximization of global welfare or
fairness, the hierarchical structure of society needs to be identified and
addressed. This analysis casts doubt on the desirability of the existing nor-
mative bases of global antitrust law and anti-dumping law. It argues,
among other things, that the consumer welfare standard is incoherent and
that low prices should necessarily be considered as beneficial. Yet, it defies
a conclusion that the object of resistance is economic theory or economic
thinking.
Crane’s distributional analysis shows the unpredictable, unforeseen
and complex distributional consequences of lawmaking. By contrast,
Crane claims the antitrust system is reasonably competent at generating
consumer welfare and economic efficiency by creating a larger pie.235 This
“will yield the best allocation of economic resources, the lowest prices, the
highest quality, and the greatest material progress, while at the same time
providing an environment conducive to the preservation of democratic po-
litical and social institutions.”236 However, this system rests on several in-
coherent assumptions and allows countless injuries that are unrelated to
merit, innovation, or effort. The combat against the concentration of
wealth, power, and prestige requires a step outside the existing antitrust
and trade paradigm and needs to address the hierarchical structure of the
global society—the disparity in the global allocation of privileges to harm.
Despite the complexity and difficulty of measuring the precise effects
of our work, we can identify repetitive structures at play, structures that
235. Crane, supra note 36, at 1177 n.13.
236. N. Pac. Ry. Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1958).
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need to be articulated and addressed. “Dumping practices of the center” is
a doctrine that addresses the privilege to harm that is missed both in eco-
nomic analysis and in the debate about social justice and offers one analy-
sis and explanation for the reproduction of hierarchies and concentration
of power, wealth, knowledge, authority, and prestige in the center of the
European Union, despite the EU’s promise of equal economic develop-
ment for all. Unless such hidden hierarchies and injuries are identified,
there is no potential for remedying them, neither by the tax and transfer
regime nor by the legal system.
But it is not only the European Union that is hierarchically structured.
Global society is a hierarchical structure, granting different opportunities
to people in diverse positions in the hierarchical structure to injure others.
Hierarchies cannot be alleviated, but they can be reversed and recon-
structed.237 The construction of dumping on the EU internal market is
situated in a particular time and place, but it is an example of an analysis
of the global hierarchical structure that I would propose for the future
exploration of challenging the concentration of wealth, power, knowledge,
authority, and prestige globally.
Paul Krugman238 and Anthony Atkinson239 claim that monopoly and
anticompetitive market conditions are among the root causes of wealth
inequality, but this is based on a mistaken understanding of global govern-
ance. Antitrust enforcement accounts for a tiny fraction of global govern-
ance. No field of law alone can capture the complexity or the magnitude of
the global hierarchical struggle and of the reproduction of existing hierar-
chies in the world. The phenomenon is far larger and each of us is impli-
cated in it in every moment.240 Yet, the tools of antitrust and trade
analysis can aid in the articulation of resistance to the existing hierarchical
structure.
Reproduction of hierarchies is due to our constant bringing of the past
into the present. In other words, the hierarchies and injuries of the past
moment that remain unchallenged are the law of today.241 Lawyers are
constantly governing the world as any other person, but we have the ana-
lytical tools to articulate these countless injuries and challenge them.
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